Smith//IRV: Difference between revisions
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Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (I didn't actually look at the book, but Smith says "T.N.Tideman, in his book, considered a particular voting method ...") |
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2. Perform an [[IRV]] tally among remaining candidates.<ref name="Tideman 2006 p.">{{cite book | last=Tideman | first=Nicolaus | title=Collective decisions and voting : the potential for public choice | publisher=Ashgate | publication-place=Aldershot, England Burlington, VT | year=2006 | isbn=0-7546-4717-X | oclc=70334914 | page=}}</ref> |
2. Perform an [[IRV]] tally among remaining candidates.<ref name="Tideman 2006 p.">{{cite book | last=Tideman | first=Nicolaus | title=Collective decisions and voting : the potential for public choice | publisher=Ashgate | publication-place=Aldershot, England Burlington, VT | year=2006 | isbn=0-7546-4717-X | oclc=70334914 | page=}}</ref> |
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Example: |
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49 A>B |
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3 B |
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48 C>B |
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B [[pairwise beat|pairwise beats]] A (51 to 49) and C (52 to 48), so B is the only candidate in the [[Smith set]] i.e. is the [[Condorcet winner]]. Therefore, A and C are eliminated, and B, being the only remaining candidate, wins. |
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== Notes == |
== Notes == |
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