Dominant mutual third set: Difference between revisions
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It can be proven that several other [[:Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods|Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] pass dominant mutual third burial resistance. For example, with [[Benham's method]], since at least one member of the smallest DMT set is guaranteed to be one of the two final remaining candidates after eliminating the rest, there is no incentive for a voter who honestly prefers that DMT member over the other final remaining candidate to not vote that preference i.e. the same incentive for honest voting exists as if it was a [[runoff]]. This is one major reason cited by those who prefer Condorcet-IRV methods, as they claim that most elections feature a DMT set (i.e. perhaps because the voters are polarized into two sides, and with one side being majority-preferred to the other), and therefore these methods will be more [[Strategic voting|strategically resistant]] in practice than many others.
== Notes ==
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