Reciprocal Score Voting: Difference between revisions
→Analysis
No edit summary |
|||
Line 92:
Since the incentive for betrayal is eliminated, but the rewards for collaborating are preserved, Reciprocal Score Voting minimizes concerns with Chicken Dilemma scenarios. Thus in any sufficiently large mutual majority scenario, the likelihood of either A or B winning will be very large (although not guaranteed due to the non-ranked nature of the system).
=== Passed/Failed criteria ===
* [[Majority criterion]]: as the pre and post-adjustment ballots are both score ballots and operate in a similar fashion, strictly speaking RSV fails the majority criterion under more exotic circumstances. However, it does so only if the majority's and the winning candidate's factions highly rate one another, which is a less problematic situation. It is, however, very robust to strong majorities:
::{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Faction !! Voters!! A !! B
|-
| A || 80 || 10 || ''b''
|-
| B || 20 || ''a'' || 10
|}
A is a significant 80% majority, but B can still win under regular score voting if ''b'' ≥ 8, with ''a'' ≤ 5. Under RSV, however, B can never win for any size of the A majority or values for ''a'' and ''b''.
* [[Mutual majority criterion]]: as in the chicken dilemma scenario mentioned previously and for the same reasons as in the majority criterion, strictly speaking it fails, but it is unlikely and failures likely less severe.
* [[Monotonicity criterion]]: as RSV ties together the support given to multiple candidates, it is monotonic in a very exotic way, especially with respect to the favorite candidates: a favorite candidate can have a lower chance of winning by lowering the scores of another candidate.
* [[Condorcet criterion]]
== Variants ==
| |||