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Symmetrical ICT: Difference between revisions
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'''Here is a definition of Symmetrical ICT:'''
(X>Y) means the number of ballots ranking X over Y
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'''Favorite-Burial Criterion (FBC):'''
A candidate is top-voted, and at top, on a ballot if that ballot doesn't vote anyone over that candidate.
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'''A few improved properties of ICT and Symmetrical ICT
I already mentioned that ICT and Symmetrical ICT meet FBC. That's the main, most important, difference between Symmetrical ICT and traditional, unimproved Condorcet.
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Let me add here that I suggest that all of our official public elections are u/a. So what does it tell us, when the best that a rank method can do is no different from Approval? It suggests that there's no need or reason to bother with rank methods in official public elections.
Well, I take that back: There is one way in which ICT and Symmetrical ICT improve on
I don't claim that Symmetrical ICT actually strictly meets Later-No-Help (LNHe). Approval strictly meets LNHe.
LNHe says that, when you've voted for some candidates on your ballot (you vote for a candidate if you vote him/her over someone), then you don't need to vote for
In Symmetrical ICT, if a voter had sufficiently detailed and reliable predictive information, s/he could probably sometimes gain by ranking some unacceptable candidates, more winnable ones over less winnable ones. But there's no such information available. One thing that Symmetrical ICT guarantees is that, by leaving some particular two candidates unranked, you're doing everything that you can
Michael Ossipoff
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