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Vote unitarity: Difference between revisions
Tied in familiar terms like Equally Weighted Vote and One-Person-One-Vote in the first sentence for clarity. Changed single winner criterion section to name the Equal Vote Criterion specifically. Standardized capitalization. When a proper name of a defined term is more than one word long, such as Vote Unitiarity, both words should be capitalized.
(→History: Inserting link Dr. Edmonds provided in on the talk page as a reference) |
(Tied in familiar terms like Equally Weighted Vote and One-Person-One-Vote in the first sentence for clarity. Changed single winner criterion section to name the Equal Vote Criterion specifically. Standardized capitalization. When a proper name of a defined term is more than one word long, such as Vote Unitiarity, both words should be capitalized.) |
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'''Vote
== Rationale ==
When [[Single Transferable Vote]] allocates voters to winners it can violate vote unitarity by over removing influence in some cases. This occurs in all allocation systems; for example in [[Allocated Score]] somebody who only gave a score of 1 to the winner could lose all future influence. [[Reweighted Range Voting]] on the other hand only reduces influence fractionally so a voter who got a candidate they gave max score in the first round would only have their ballot weight reduced to 1/2. This violates the principle of one person one vote since this voter would essentially be allowed to vote with half weight in later rounds after "winning". Proponents of [[Single Transferable Vote]] would use this argument for its superior fairness over [[Reweighted Range Voting]] and the [[Reweighted Range Voting]] use the opposite argument. Since [[Reweighted Range Voting]] and [[Single Transferable Vote]] are very popular systems which violate Vote Unitarity in opposite ways it should be possible to find a balanced middle ground,
On an even further extreme, "Choose One" Plurality [[Bloc voting]] when treated as a sequential method often violates Vote Unitarity even more than [[Reweighted Range Voting]] since a voter can fully influence the election of multiple candidates independently without any reweighing. [[Cumulative voting | Cumulative Voting]] attempts to mitigate this by giving voters the same
== Example ==
In a 5-winner election, if there is a candidate that 90% of voters maximally support, and that the other 10% of voters don't support, supposing this candidate is the first one elected, with [[D'Hondt method |
==Relation to Similar Concepts==
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The weight of each voters ballot is given the same initial weight. This is the interpretation that the U.S. Supreme Court holds states to. It’s failed by single-winner methods that use unequally-populated districts and the Electoral College. This concept is independent from Vote Unitarity. If a voter's weight is initially unequal, Vote Unitarity will maintain that inequality.
===The
The test of balance is [https://www.starvoting.us/equal_vote defined] as the following "Any way I vote, you should be able to vote in an equal and opposite fashion. Our votes should be able to cancel each other’s out."
Vote Unitarity is not incompatible with this but the concept of a
== Compliance ==
Vote
=== Single member systems ===
In [[Single Member system|single member systems]] this property is
===Multi-member systems===
In sequential [[Multi-Member System|multi-member systems]] this concept become especially relevant due to the different rounds of tabulation. Specifically, a voter whose favorite has been elected should not have influence over subsequent rounds. On the other side, a voter who has not been fully
===Partisan systems===
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==History==
[[Keith Edmonds]] saw a unification of [[Proportional representation|Proportional Representation]] and the concept of one person one vote which was maintained throughout winner the winner selection method. He coined the term "vote unitarity" for the second concept<ref>https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/electionscience/Tzt_z6pBt8A</ref> and designed a score reweighting system which satisfied both Hare Quota Criterion and Vote Unitarity. As such it would preserve the amount of score used through sequential rounds while attributing representation in a partitioned way. It would assign Hare Quotas of score to winners which allowed for a voters influence to be spread over multiple winners. The final system was originally proposed in a late stage of the [[W: 2018 British Columbia electoral reform referendum]] but was not selected for the referendum ballot. This system, [[Sequentially Spent Score]], was the first sequential [[Multi-Member System | Multi-Winner]] [[Cardinal voting systems |
== References ==
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