Stable winner set: Difference between revisions
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In proportional representation, a '''stable winner set''' (called the '''core''' in game theory parlance<ref>{{Cite journal|title=|url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3357713.3384238|journal=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|title=|url=https://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.11747.pdf|journal=}}</ref>) is a requirement on a winner set:
{{Definition| Given a winner set <math>S</math> of <math>k</math> winners, another winner set <math>S^\prime</math> containing <math>k^\prime</math> winners blocks <math>S</math> iff <math>\frac{V(S,S^\prime)}{n} \geq \frac{K^\prime}{K}</math>, where <math>V(S,S^\prime)</math> is the number of voters who strictly prefer <math>S^\prime</math> to <math>S</math>, and <math>n</math> is the number of voters.
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Each group of voters should feel that their preferences are sufficiently respected, so that they are not incentivized to deviate and choose an alternative winner set of smaller weight. In the common scenario that we do not know beforehand the exact nature of the demographic coalitions, we adopt the robust solution concept which requires the winner set to be agnostic to any potential subset of voters deviating. This means that the requirement of a stable winner set is equivalent to but more robust than the concept of [[Proportional representation]].
This is a more strict definition than the Hare Quota Criterion which is typically what is used as a stand-in for Proportional Representation in non-partisan systems since there is no universally accepted definition. The existing definitions of [[Proportional Representation]] are unclear and conflicting. A clear
==Example==
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