Strategy-free criterion: Difference between revisions

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The reader may be wondering how the Condorcet candidate, if one exists, could

possibly ~~~~not~~~~ be preferred by a majority of voters over any

possibly ''not'' be preferred by a majority of voters over any

other candidate. The key is that some voters may have no preference

between a given pair of candidates. Out of 100 voters, for example, 45

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In order to understand SFC, one must also understand that there are

two types of insincere votes: false preferences and truncated

preferences. Voters ~~~~truncate~~~~ by terminating their rank list

preferences. Voters ''truncate'' by terminating their rank list

before their true preferences are fully specified (note that the last

choice is always implied, so leaving it out is not considered

truncation). Voters ~~~~falsify~~~~ their preferences, on the other

truncation). Voters ''falsify'' their preferences, on the other

hand, by reversing the order of their true preferences or by specifying

a preference they don't really have. Suppose, for example, that a

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candidate to win by truncating their preferences. (In theory, that

minority could cause the other candidate to win by falsifying their

preferences, but that would be a very risky ~~~~offensive~~~~ strategy

preferences, but that would be a very risky ''offensive'' strategy

that is more likely to backfire than to succeed.) The significance of

the SFC guarantee is that the majority has no need for defensive