Summed-Ranks: Difference between revisions
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Add reference to Borda and Approval, as it's a version of Borda that behaves like Approval when voters only use two ranks
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m (Add reference to Borda and Approval, as it's a version of Borda that behaves like Approval when voters only use two ranks) |
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'''Summed-Ranks''' (abbreviated '''SR''') is a ranked voting method based on [[Approval voting]] and the [[Borda count]].
{{definition|
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== Analysis ==
SR meets criteria not met by other Borda versions. These are listed
=== The
SR passes the [[favorite betrayal criterion]]. Because of of SR's FBC compliance, SR gives no incentive or need for
▲Because of SR's FBC compliance, SR gives no incentive or need for the "compromise strategy" described below in this article. There's never a reason to not rank one's favorite in 1st place, along with whatever compromise(s) one wishes to also rank there.
=== [[Later-No-Help]] ===
SR passes [[Later-no-help]]. Because of SR's
▲Because of SR's LNHe compliance, SR never gives incentive or need to rank unacceptable candidates. If the most important goal is to keep the winner from coming from a certain set, then, for that goal, it is never necessary to rank any member of that set.
=== Others ===
SR's other criterion-compliances are similar to those of other Borda versions. For example, SR passes [[Participation criterion|Participation]] and [[Consistency]], and fails [[Independence
In addition to Participation, SR passes Participation's more-easily-passed variations:
==== Mono-Add-Top
{{definition|Adding, to the election, a ballot that votes X at top shouldn't cause X to lose.}}▼
▲Adding, to the election, a ballot that votes X at top shouldn't cause X to lose.
{{definition|Adding a ballot that votes X over everyone else shouldn't cause X to lose.}}▼
▲Mono-Add-Unique-Top:
== Comments ==
▲Adding a ballot that votes X over everyone else shouldn't cause X to lose.
SR greatly alleviates the typical Borda clone problem. In ordinary Borda, it's advantageous for a faction or party to nominate many identical candidates. Even when the alternatives-set is fixed, sets of very similar alternatives are favored.
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SR is for when it's desired to give voters the simple instruction to mark 1st choice(s), 2nd choice(s), etc., instead of asking them to rate the candidates or alternatives, and the number of alternatives is prohibitively large for a Condorcet hand count, and a Condorcet-programmed computer isn't available to do the count.
▲[[Category:Preferential voting methods]]
[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]]
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:No-favorite-betrayal electoral systems]]
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