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Symmetrical ICT: Difference between revisions
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(X>Y) means the number of ballots ranking X over Y
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Justifications for ICT and Symmetrical ICT:
One justification is that they gain compliance with [[FBC]].
Another is that they automatically avoid the chicken dilemma, meeting the [[Chicken Dilemma Criterion]].
Additionally, suppose that you rank two candidates, X and Y in 1st place. You rank them in 1st place because you'd prefer that they win, instead of the other candidates.
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Besides, the reason why the method uses that interpretation is likewise because it's more legitimate, and what the equal top ranking voter prefers.
And that genuine legitimacy is the reason why Symmetrical ICT meets [[FBC]] (unlike traditional unimproved Condorcet).
So: Improved Condorcet versions, including ICT and Symmetrical ICT, meet the Condorcet Criterion, when it is defined more legitmately.
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A candidate is top-voted, and at top, on a ballot if that ballot doesn't vote anyone over that candidate.
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The Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD):
'''Supporting definitions:'''
1. The A voters are the voters who prefer candidate A to every other
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preferences that s/he actually votes.
'''Premise:'''
1. The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half
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voters).
'''Requirement:'''
B doesn't win.
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'''A few improved properties of ICT and Symmetrical ICT:'''
I already mentioned that ICT and Symmetrical ICT meet [[FBC]]. That's the main, most important, difference between Symmetrical ICT and traditional, unimproved Condorcet.
But, additionally, ICT and Symmetrical ICT, automatically avoid the chicken dilemma. They meet CD, the Chicken Dilemma Criterion.
'''Comparison of strategy in a u/a election:'''
When there are unacceptable candidates who could win, that can greatly simplify voting strategy. I call such a situation a u/a election (standing for unacceptable/acceptable). It's a situaiton in which all that matters is that the winner be an acceptable rather than an unacceptable. ...and that's incomparably more imporant than the matter of which acceptable or which unacceptable wins. You could say that the candidates can be divided into two sets, such that the merit within the sets is negligible compared to the merit difference between the sets.
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Let me add here that I suggest that all of our official public elections are u/a. So what does it tell us, when the best that a rank method can do is no different from Approval? It suggests that there's no need or reason to bother with rank methods in official public elections.
Well,
The count-computation-intensiveness of rank methods, and the consequent count-fraud vulnerabiity, make rank methods unsuitable for official public elections. But I propose ICT and Symmetrical ICT for informational polling, to inform and guide strategy in an upcoming official public election by Plurality--until we can replace Plurality with [[Approval]] or [[Score]] ([[Range]]).
I don't claim that Symmetrical ICT actually strictly meets [[Later-No-Help]] (LNHe). Approval strictly meets LNHe.
LNHe says that, when you've voted for some candidates on your ballot (you vote for a candidate if you vote him/her over someone), then you don't need to vote for additional candidates on that ballot in order to help as much as you can the candidates for whom you've already voted.
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