Tactical voting: Difference between revisions

While no deterministic voting method may be strategy-free, the degree that they reward strategy differ greatly. [[Plurality voting]] and the [[Borda count]] generally often reward tactical voting, while [[Condorcet-IRV hybrid_methodshybrid methods]] are considerably more robust.<ref name="Green 2001 four">{{cite journal | last=Green-Armytage |first=James |title=Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods for single-winner elections | journal=Voting matters | issue=29 | page=8 | year=2011 | url=http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE29/I29P1.pdf}}</ref>

François Durand found that for voting methods passing the [[ Informed majority coalition criterion|a weak form of the majority criterion]], modifying the method to elect the [[Condorcet winner]] whenever one exists can never increase the susceptibility to strategy. He also found that, given an independence assumption, asking for more information than ranks can't unlock higher levels of strategy resistance. Durand thus argues that a search for the most strategy-resistant voting method can be restricted to ranked methods that pass the Condorcet criterion.<ref name="Durand Mathieu Noirie 2014 v533">{{cite web | last=Durand | first=François | last2=Mathieu | first2=Fabien | last3=Noirie | first3=Ludovic | title=Making a voting system depend only on orders of preference reduces its manipulability rate | website=Sorbonne Université | date=2014-06-17 | url=https://hal.sorbonne-universite.fr/hal-01009136/ | access-date=2024-04-21}}</ref>