Tactical voting: Difference between revisions
Add sources on predisposition to sincerity, and clean up formatting of some ballot examples
(Provide more information about burial as it relates to LNH.) |
(Add sources on predisposition to sincerity, and clean up formatting of some ballot examples) |
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'''Burying-compression''' is a burying strategy that involves insincerely giving two candidates an equal ranking or rating (or truncating, which generally amounts to the same thing).
'''Burying-reversal''' is a burying strategy that involves insincerely reversing the order of two candidates on the ballot. <blockquote>30 A>B ▼
▲'''Burying-reversal''' is a burying strategy that involves insincerely reversing the order of two candidates on the ballot.
25 B>A ▼
{{ballots|
30: A>B
▲25: B>A
40: C}}
Burying is often discussed in the context of [[Condorcet methods]], where it can be used to create strategic [[Condorcet cycle]]<nowiki/>s. Also see [[later-no-help]] for some examples of burying.
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[[Free riding]] is a form of tactical voting which affects any [[Multi-Member System]] that has a mechanisms to increase the level of [[Proportional representation]]. The strategy is to lower your endorsement for candidates which you expect to be elected without your support. This allows more of your vote power to go into electing other candidates, because the voting method takes less of your voting power.
2-winner example:
{{ballots|
30: A1>A2
14: B1▼
5: C1}}
▲14 B1
▲5 C1</blockquote>In any PR method that spends a Droop quota or more of ballots when a candidate is elected, A1 is likely to win first, and then at least 16.333 A voters' ballots will be spent, leaving them with 13.666 ballots to support A2. This allows B1 to win the second seat in most methods. However, if the A1 voters had split into two groups of 15 voters each, with one [[bullet voting]] (only voting for) A1 and the other only for A2, then they guarantee that both A1 and A2 win in most methods, because the two candidates have more votes each (15) than the other candidates (B1 with 14 and C1 with only 5), and when the votes in favor of one are spent, only the 15 voters who chose that candidate lose their ballot weight.
=== Other types of strategic voting ===
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Academic analysis of tactical voting is based on the rational voter model, derived from [[rational choice theory]]. In this model, voters are ''short-term instrumentally rational''. That is, voters are only voting in order to make an impact on one election at a time (not, say, to build the political party for next election); voters have a set of sincere preferences, or utility rankings, by which to rate candidates; voters have some knowledge of each other's preferences; and voters understand how best to use tactical voting to their advantage. The extent to which this model resembles real-life elections is the subject of considerable academic debate.
=== Predisposition to sincerity ===
Some experiments have found that voters tend to behave sincerely more often than the instrumentally rational model indicates. In an experiment designed to have a low barrier to sophisticated voting, Herzberg and Wilson found that only 20%-40% of the voters made use of the opportunity; the rest voted sincerely.<ref name="Herzberg Wilson 1988 pp. 471–486">{{cite journal | last=Herzberg | first=Roberta Q. | last2=Wilson | first2=Rick K. | title=Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting | journal=The Journal of Politics | publisher=[University of Chicago Press, Southern Political Science Association] | volume=50 | issue=2 | year=1988 | issn=00223816, 14682508 | jstor=2131804 | pages=471–486 | url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131804 | access-date=2021-12-06}}</ref>
Blais and Nadeau use a two-step analysis procedure to argue that 30% of the voters who would have benefited from strategic voting in the 1988 Canadian election actually did vote strategically.<ref name="Blais Nadeau 1996 pp. 39–52">{{cite journal | last=Blais | first=André | last2=Nadeau | first2=Richard | title=Measuring strategic voting: A two-step procedure | journal=Electoral Studies | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=15 | issue=1 | year=1996 | issn=0261-3794 | doi=10.1016/0261-3794(94)00014-x | pages=39–52}}</ref> They furthermore reason that tactical voting is more prevalent if the voters have only a weak intensity of preference for their first choice over their second, or if the election is a close race between their second and third choice.
== Pre-election influence ==
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*[[Strategy-free criterion]]
*[[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]]
== References ==
<references/>
== External links ==
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