Tactical voting: Difference between revisions
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While no deterministic voting method may be strategy-free, the degree that they reward strategy differ greatly. [[Plurality voting]] and the [[Borda count]] often reward tactical voting, while [[Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] are considerably more robust.<ref name="Green 2001 four">{{cite journal | last=Green-Armytage |first=James |title=Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods for single-winner elections | journal=Voting matters | issue=29 | page=8 | year=2011 | url=http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE29/I29P1.pdf}}</ref>
François Durand found that for voting methods passing
A variety of criteria have been devised to indicate forms of strategy resistance. See, for instance, [[dominant mutual third burial resistance]].
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