Talk:Arrow's impossibility theorem: Difference between revisions
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::::::: OK I understand. This is the sort of thing that systems like [[Distributed Voting]] try to get around. I have a bit of a rant on this [https://forum.electionscience.org/t/utilitarian-vs-majoritarian-in-single-winner/602 here]. Score has a built in assumption that candidates will not be added and removed. In any case, I do not think this is really related to Arrow's theorem directly so can we all agree that Arrow's theorem does not apply to score? This other stuff is interesting though. Perhaps somebody wants to add some explanation to the [[Voting paradox]] page. All the theorems are tied together in some way and they are all important. I did not know till vary recently that [[Balinski–Young theorem]] extends to multi-member systems. It implies that all Monroe type systems fail something like participation. Furthermore, there are Multimember systems where the score does have a much more absolute scale. The most obvious is [[Sequentially Spent Score]]. --[[User:Dr. Edmonds|Dr. Edmonds]] ([[User talk:Dr. Edmonds|talk]]) 01:53, 21 March 2020 (UTC)
:::::::: Quote from Dr. Edmonds: "Score has a built in assumption that candidates will not be added and removed." With such an assumption, it may be possible to make many ranked methods evade Arrow's Theorem as well. [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy|talk]]) 02:07, 21 March 2020 (UTC)
::::::::: Well if you can formalize and prove that then there is a Nobel Prize in it for you. Social choice theory generally assumes that the choices come as part of the problem. This is one criticism of the whole field. We are going pretty far off topic. Lets move this to a forum. --[[User:Dr. Edmonds|Dr. Edmonds]] ([[User talk:Dr. Edmonds|talk]]) 05:22, 21 March 2020 (UTC)
:::::::::: Yes, let's take it to the election-methods list, then we can refer to the thread from here. I'd just say, in conclusion, that I think it's possible to phrase this in an Arrovian context, and that E-M style voting theory is already outside of social choice if what you're saying is true (consider e.g. Tideman's independence of clones criterion). [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 10:29, 21 March 2020 (UTC)
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