Talk:Arrow's impossibility theorem: Difference between revisions
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:::::: Pretty much. By "relative scale" I mean in the sense of Balinski and Laraki: an absolute scale is where the grades (or ratings) mean the same thing for everybody, a relative one is where what ratings you provide depend on what candidates are running. I don't know of a published proof, but it seems obvious, just follow [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy]]'s suggestion: you set up an election where there's a Condorcet cycle and no matter who wins, if another candidate drops out then winner loses the resulting majority election. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 23:25, 20 March 2020 (UTC)
::::::: OK I understand. This is the sort of thing that systems like [[Distributed Voting]] try to get around. I have a bit of a rant on this [https://forum.electionscience.org/t/utilitarian-vs-majoritarian-in-single-winner/602 here]. Score has a built in assumption that candidates will not be added and removed. In any case, I do not think this is really related to Arrow's theorem directly so can we all agree that Arrow's theorem does not apply to score? This other stuff is interesting though. Perhaps somebody wants to add some explanation to the [[Voting paradox]] page. All the theorems are tied together in some way and they are all important. I did not know till vary recently that [[Balinski–Young theorem]] extends to multi-member systems. It implies that all Monroe type systems fail something like participation. Furthermore, there are Multimember systems where the score does have a much more absolute scale. The most obvious is [[Sequentially Spent Score]]. --[[User:Dr. Edmonds|Dr. Edmonds]] ([[User talk:Dr. Edmonds|talk]]) 01:53, 21 March 2020 (UTC)
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