Talk:Condorcet method

Another possible acronym for condorcet methods is Virtual One-on-one Tournament Elections - VOTE. Homunq 15:07, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Self referential condorcet method

The article "One which always elects the pairwise champion if such exists", the thing is the parwise competition is made with first part the post (or something similar to approval system if you allow equal rankings).

Couldn't you have some sort of self referential Condorcet method, where you check if someone won the pairwise competition, using the voting method you are testing to check if it's a condorcet method or not? Range voting as some example would pass this self referential condorcet method (also range vote is better than first past the post even with just two candidates).

User:177.92.128.62 Can you give an example? This is hard to follow. — Psephomancy (talk) 04:16, 9 June 2019 (UTC)

1-10 Range voting and 3 candidates, A, B and C and 3 voters 1, 2 and 3:

Voter 1: Give score of 1 to A, 7 to B and 8 to C

Voter 2: Give score of 10 to A, 7 to B and 8 to C

Voter 3: Give score of 4 to A, 10 to B and 5 to C

C beats both A and B and is the normal condorcet winner, but loses the election to B: ((10+7+7)/3)=8 VS ((8+8+5)/3)=7

Under Self referential Condorcet Criterion each pairwise competition is made using the voting system being used (at this case range voting) so, B vs A is (10+7+7/3=8) VS (1+10+4/3=5) and B is the winner, B vs C is (10+7+7/3=8) VS (8+8+5/3=7) and here B is the winner to, and so he is the self referential condorcet winner, and the self referential condorcet winner, won the election, but the normal condorcet winner didn't and the normal condorcet didn't because we used a "worse system" I mean if it was not worse, there would be "no need" to analise this new one.177.92.128.62 13:29, 18 September 2019 (UTC)

Ah, I think I understand. So "Given a voting method, if the winner of that voting method would beat every other candidate in head-to-head elections using that same voting method for the head-to-head elections"? — Psephomancy (talk) 15:28, 18 September 2019 (UTC)

YES, "Given a voting method, if the winner of that voting method would beat every other candidate in head-to-head elections using that same voting method for the head-to-head elections he should be the one that would win the election"?

Marquette

I doubt that Marquette, Michigan, used the Nanson method. I rather believe that Marquette used the Baldwin method and that Hallett mixed up the Nanson method and the Baldwin method (Clarence G. Hoag, George H. Hallett, "Proportional Representation", Macmillan, 1926). The reason for my suspicion: Whenever Hallett tries to formulate statutory rules for the Nanson method, he actually formulates the Baldwin method. Is there an independent source that says that Marquette used the Nanson method? MarkusSchulze (talk) 19:03, 2 April 2020 (UTC)

Write-in candidates

The article says: "Write-ins are possible, but are somewhat more difficult to implement for automatic counting than in other election methods. This is a counting issue, but results in the frequent omission of the write-in option in ballot software." Can someone explain why this is the case? The reason I ask is because I'm guessing the issue is the following (and I have a solution to this): when you're counting each ballot, you have to record the pairwise preferences of that ballot against all write-in candidates. Yet, you can't know who all the write-in candidates are until you've finished processing all ballots. Therefore, you either have to do two rounds of counting the ballots, or skip write-ins. If so, my solution is to use the Pairwise counting#Negative vote-counting approach, wherein when each ballot is counted, you add any new write-in candidates found on it to the pairwise comparison matrix. BetterVotingAdvocacy (talk) 00:28, 14 May 2020 (UTC)