Talk:Dominant mutual third set: Difference between revisions
→Practical Importance and Justification for DMTBR
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: Simple DMTBR methods like [[instant-runoff voting]] have much too high compromise incentive, so I prefer Condorcet methods.
: My own simulations suggest that what's actually important to get a nonzero fraction of strategy-immune elections in impartial culture is [[resistant set]] compliance. In that case, DMTBR's interest would broadly be as a clone-resistant generalization of resistant set. But I haven't proven this beyond a few burial immunity results for the resistant set. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 12:38, 22 February 2024 (UTC)
:: "Bounding the (IAC) probability that an election can be manipulated" seems like a ''great'' justification! It's intuitive and important. Maybe this should be placed front-and-center in the article?
:: I don't think I have the experience or game-theory knowledge to prove results like this, but I've wanted a table of P(manipulation) values for a long time. Even better would be something like VSE lost to manipulation; ideally these would select the utility lost in the worst-case Myerson-Webb or Strong Nash equilibrium. (Condorcet seems to reduce the number of elections that voters can manipulate, but might make the outcome worse when they ''are'' manipulated; so probability methods are going to be somewhat, but not totally, convincing.) The issue is that tackling all these issues by creating separate criteria (Chicken, DMTBR, etc.) one-by-one is going to take, well, literally forever by Gibbard's theorem. --[[User:Closed Limelike Curves|Closed Limelike Curves]] ([[User talk:Closed Limelike Curves|talk]]) 18:47, 23 February 2024 (UTC)
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