Talk:Instant-runoff voting: Difference between revisions
→Fixing the shortcomings of IRV
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Please consider using an eleven step instant runoff process to make IRV more fair. ▼
I have used Google Sheets to create a demonstrator. I'm old and not an expert in anything. But I'm pretty sure it works. I will be very embarrassed if I've made typos in the formulae and the results don't make sense. Point it out and I'll fix it. Here's a link to my spreadsheet:▼
▲Please consider using an eleven step instant runoff process to make IRV more fair.
▲I have used Google Sheets to create a demonstrator. I'm old and not an expert in anything. But I'm pretty sure it works. I will be very embarrassed if I've made typos in the formulae and the results don't make sense. Point it out and I'll fix it.
--[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 05:00, 2 December 2023 (UTC)
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== Variants: ways of dealing with equal rankings (see STV page) ==
For discussion, I offer this alternative. The
▲30 A=C>B
35 B>A>C
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20 C>B>A
With A
▲With C claiming the better rank in RVH, C wins.
▲With A claiming the better rank, it is a three way tie.
In the other example given on “Ways to deal with equal ranking”
34 A=B=C
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33 E
The winner is whichever of A, B or C claims the best ranking in the RVH.
[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 12:27, 29 December 2023 (UTC)
What should a good voting system do when voters rank candidates equally?
Respecting the fairness of one voter - one vote, a random decision is a very good way to decide which candidate gets that shared vote first. Of course, getting that shared vote first matters a great deal to the candidates. It could be the difference between winning and losing. But which of them deserves to get these votes first? The answer is, they all do. They all want to have the votes that come with the equal rank before anyone else. The fair thing to do is to choose one of them by random draw at the very start of counting (RVH them). It’s all or nothing to avoid vote splitting. Vote splitting is what election campaigns do best because IRV rewards them for trying. The voters deserve better. A voter who thinks their favorite candidates are tied doesn’t deserve being set upon by those very same candidates to get that vote first. Vote splitting makes for nasty business especially when the election is too close to call. Take that tried and true pressure tactic away from candidates and it’s a good tie for everyone. The question then becomes should candidates expend their campaign resources on telling voters what’s wrong with an opponent they are afraid will make them lose, or focus on what’s right about themselves compared to all the candidates? My improvement to IRV answers for the voters.
[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 18:11, 2 January 2024 (UTC)
== RE: Criticisms, commenting on later-no-harm and later-no-help ==
If IRV is ignoring most of the ballot (to satisfy later-no-harm and later-no-help) at the expense of center squeeze and favorite betrayal, then can we fix that and still call it IRV? Although I thought later-no-harm was the gold standard of a fair vote, my improved IRV fails later-no-harm and later-no-help. I'm happy that it does.
An example of SV failing Later-no-harm.
46 A
10 B
SV finds a 3 way tie which results in one of 3 candidates being elected by random draw.
(IRV elects A). What happens when supporters of A go too far?
46 A>B
10 B
44 C>B
SV elects B, thereby A loses a third of a chance to win by adding B as a preference (IRV still elects A, no harm done). By definition, I believe this violates later-no-harm.
An example of SV failing Later-no-help.
12 A
8 B>A
6 C>B
Standard Vote elects B (IRV elects B).
Variation 1: When 3 of the A voters change their votes to C, the result is a three way tie to be broken by random draw (IRV elects A, in effect failing later-no-help).
9 A
3 C
8 B>A
6 C>B
Variation 2: Alternatively, if those 3 voters had changed their ballots to A>C it’s the same tie (IRV still elects B, it doesn’t help).
9 A
3 A>C
8 B>C
6 C>B
In both variation 1 and 2, the probability of electing A has increased. A goes from total defeat to a small chance. By definition, I believe this violates later-no-help.
[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 01:04, 4 January 2024 (UTC)
: The former example looks like a later-no-harm failure. I don't think your variation 1 of the latter example shows later-no-help failure (as the voters change their ballots from A to C), but the second does.
: You can fix [[Left, Center, Right|LCR-type]] center squeeze by passing Condorcet, but this will automatically fail all three of later-no-help, later-no-harm, and favorite betrayal. Some such methods could possibly be called IRV - e.g. [[Benham's method]] or [[BTR-IRV]]. But it's pretty difficult to say at what point a fixed IRV method is no longer IRV.
: I don't know if it's possible to pass later-no-harm, later-no-help, and do the right thing in a center squeeze situation. While Condorcet rules out the two LNHs, it could be the case that a weaker criterion still fixes center squeeze; and this criterion could possibly be compatible with the LNHs. But nobody on the election-methods list has come up with such a method. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 19:06, 4 January 2024 (UTC)
== Re: Assessing IRV, the advantages of normal runoff voting over IRV. ==
My suggested improvement to IRV, [[user:RalphInOttawa/Standard Vote]], sort of has that CHANCE FOR APPEAL (a claimed advantage of normal runoff voting over IRV). Supporters of the runner-up will definitely have their down ballot preferences countable in the second instant runoff. Supporters of the first runoff winner get the same deal with a third instant runoff if they need it. Campaigning by candidates leading in public opinion polls would remain MORE POSITIVE because the voter’s order of preference can’t be changed between the instant runoffs.
[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 08:28, 15 January 2024 (UTC)
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