Talk:Instant-runoff voting: Difference between revisions
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: A simpler way to improve IRV is already explained at [[Ranked Choice Including Pairwise Elimination]]. --[[User:VoteFair|VoteFair]] ([[User talk:VoteFair|talk]]) 23:46, 4 December 2023 (UTC)
I'm happy that Nashville wins. When given the Condorcet paradox, please confirm that RCIPE elects A.
4 A>B
3 B>C
2 C>A
I suspect RCIPE eliminates C as having the smallest top-choice count. B becomes the runner-up, and ideally would move to a two candidate runoff A vs B. Then assuming honest opinions have been cast and remain unchanged, A wins.
This lends itself to strategic campaigning where the leading candidate ensures the least preferred candidate finishes second. That’s IRV’s problem and RCIPE campaigns will do the same thing. Then it’s favorite betrayal time, where the supporters of B>C will have to decide if they need to change to C>B. That’s unfair to the B and C voters and very convenient for candidate A. [[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 01:24, 5 December 2023 (UTC)
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