Talk:Ranked voting: Difference between revisions
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::: 2. Beyond that, we don't know what the voters' relative scales are (e.g. if A>B does that mean A: 1000, B: 1, or A: 10, B: 1?), and we have no basis for interpersonal comparison (is my first preference stronger than yours?).
:: There are other variants of ordinal voting that are not majoritarian, and thus discards the first point here. For instance, the Heitzig consensus scheme I've been talking about recently on the EM list is closer to the Rawlsian approach, although it isn't quite the same thing. While the scheme is not majoritarian, I'd still consider the voting done in it ordinal, however. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 09:45, 21 July 2020 (UTC)
:: Thinking about this a bit more, I suppose all ordinal methods are, in the sense that say Plurality or Borda is, cardinal, because their algorithms use numeric variables. But by that criterion, every deterministic, neutral, anonymous, and resolvable voting method is "cardinal". What the argument above shows is that ordinal methods are not necessarily utilitarian, or approximately utilitarian, unless every system of ethics that can be cast in a utilitarian form is also utilitarian. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 11:18, 21 July 2020 (UTC)
::: [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] That is well put. I think electowiki needs a page on this topic. A sort of comparison between the majoritarian and utilitarian philosophies which underpin different systems. I tried to give an explanation of a specific point of that [https://forum.electionscience.org/t/utilitarian-vs-majoritarian-in-single-winner/602 here]. Are you interested in giving it a shot. I have always been hesitant because I do not know where to start.
::: On a different topic are there any Rawlsian minmax electoral systems? I tried to use the total number of unspent points as a metric in PR systems to measure quality. ie MAX-sum(score) for each voter is the amount of unspent score. So you want to try to minimize the total amount of unspent score. This is basically what [[Sequentially Spent Score]] does with its reweighting but the selection is pure Utilitarian. --[[User:Dr. Edmonds|Dr. Edmonds]] ([[User talk:Dr. Edmonds|talk]]) 15:42, 21 July 2020 (UTC)
:::: There are the so-called "consensus" or "minmax" multiwinner methods, like [[Minimax approval]]. Let a voter's satisfaction with a council be his max score of a candidates on that council. Then minmax Range chooses the council so as to maximize the minimal satisfaction with that council. Approval is easier, it just minimizes the maximal Hamming distance. Since min and max are not robust statistics, these methods are vulnerable to strategy.
:::: In addition, I'd say unanimity-based voting would fit, because if the worst-off voter doesn't agree to the proposal, it doesn't happen. However, high supermajority and unanimity voting have a status-quo bias, which is what the Heitzig mechanism I've referred to tries to do away with.
:::: As for your other question, I might, but I think I would need more time than I have at the moment to just sit down and think about, as you put it, where to start. So perhaps someday! [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 17:00, 21 July 2020 (UTC)
::::: [[User:Dr. Edmonds|Dr. Edmonds]], I've written a very rough first version here: [[User:Kristomun/Voting_system_philosophies]]. [[User:Kristomun|Kristomun]] ([[User talk:Kristomun|talk]]) 11:41, 16 October 2020 (UTC)
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