Talk:Sequentially Spent Score

There are many problems with your criteria table.

1. No deterministic non-delegative party agnostic proportional voting method that assigns each winner one equally weighted seat passes the favorite betrayal criteria because of free riding. While it may be theoretically possible for a proportional voting method of this type to pass FBC if you allow individual candidates to win more then one seat, there has yet to be a non deterministic non-delegative party agnostic proportional voting method that does so so if you want to assert that your method does do this you need to back it up with proof.

2. Different versions of proportional approval voting are the only non-deterministic non-delegative party agnostic approval ballot proportional voting methods that pass the consistency criterion. I've proved this on my own using hand-drawn ternary plots but I've also seen a an academic paper proving something similar to this (I'll have to find the paper). I might be wrong but this is also a big claim that needs to be proved to be accepted.

3. I'm not sure if this criteria continues to be desirable in multi winner elections, though if it is, you again have not provided any proof that your method passes it.

4. As you said yourself, vote unitary isn't a criteria but a class of voting methods. It's not a criteria so we shouldn't treat it as one.

I apologize if I sound a bit harsh. I've also recently criticized these baseless assertions for another method (https://electowiki.org/wiki/Talk:Distributed_Score_Voting).

Perhaps you should wait to post a criteria table until I finish my automatic criteria checker (I'm going to reuse a lot of the code for the ternary plots I'm making to do that as well).