Two-round system: Difference between revisions

It has been theorized that when runoff elections are held with the possibility of a candidate with a majority winning in the first round itself, that this actually incentivizes voters to do [[Favorite Betrayal]] to make a frontrunner have an "extra chance" to win (i.e. the frontrunner, who might lose in the runoff due to lower turnout or other factors, will instead win in the first round).<ref name="Bouton 2013 pp. 1248–1288">https{{cite journal | last=Bouton | first=Laurent | title=A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections | journal=The American Economic Review | volume=103 | issue=4 | year=2013 | issn=00028282 | jstor=23469618 | pages=1248–1288 | url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/23469618 | access-date=2022-02-27}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bouton|first=Laurent|last2=Gratton|first2=Gabriele|date=2015|title=Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/TE1642|journal=Theoretical Economics|language=en|volume=10|issue=2|pages=283–314|doi=10.3982/TE1642|issn=1555-7561}}</ref> Thus, it has been argued by some that a second round should always be held even if someone gets a majority in the first round. This could be modified to allow a candidate with a supermajority (say, 60%) to win in the first round, however, since the larger the majority, the less such incentive is likely to exist.