Araucaria

Joined 12 September 2018
It's been 3 years already, time for an update.
imported>Araucaria
(→‎See also: add Wisdom of Crowds reference)
imported>Araucaria
(It's been 3 years already, time for an update.)
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If it isn't immediately obvious, an explanation for my nickname can be found on my [http://www.metafilter.com Metafilter] [http://www.metafilter.com/user/23101 User Profile].
 
MyAs currentof 2005, my favorite Condorcet completion method iswas [[Definite Majority Choice]]. In the interest of expediency, I would favor some kind of transition as follows:
* Favorite plus Approval: Single Favorite vote, plus Approval of any number of other candidates. Favorite is also approved. If no Favorite wins 50% + 1, elect candidate with highest approval.
* Favorite plus [[Range Voting]]. Single Favorite as above, plus a score of 0 to 99 can be given to any number of other candidates. Same fallback as above, except total range score is used instead of approval.
 
Once a [[Range Ballot]] begins to be used, the scores could be tabulated and reported in several different formats for comparison. It might even be of benefit to randomly choose the winner between the Range Voting winner, [[Schulze]], [[Definite Majority Choice]], and [[Cardinal Pairwise]] using [[River]]. Since all four methods have similar sincere voting strategies but different "gaming" methods, it would encourage voters to simply vote by preference instead of trying to work around the system.
 
You can contact me at ''araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com''.
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* The only way to debate is on the floor of the House.
We need a method of legislation that would works quickly and transparently, whatever the size of the legislative body, be it 50, 500 or 50000. The rules need to be open and non-partisan. And the system of making those rules needs to be protected by checks and balances.
 
One way to streamline legislation would be to compress the highly inefficient technique of Robert's Rules of Order, which reduces every decision to a series of Yea/Nay votes. A strong [[Condorcet]] method could be used to resolve the preference between many options at the same time.
=== Better Representation ===
==== The House of Representatives is not representative ====
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