User:RodCrosby/QPR2: Difference between revisions

Stringer believes that a combination of political vested interest and inability to agree on one of the various true proportional systems means that it is unlikely that the UK will ever abandon FPTP for Westminster. PR squared is a system that is a relatively small change from the perspective of voters and the major parties, has some benefits for almost all parties, and accordingly may stand a higher chance of achieving consensus for its adoption. While not closely proportional, PR squared can be shown to be about half as disproportional as FPTP, according to certain common measures, in particular treating third and fourth parties which compete UK-wide more fairly. The prospect of majority government on a minority of votes remains quite possible, and in large part PR squared is advocated for pragmatic reasons.

The current single-member seats would be amalgamated into ideally units of two, although accommodation could be made to retain three island seats as single-member and, exceptionally, a few three-member seats could also exist, mostly in the cities or where a county currently has an odd number of seats. This constituency structure would mimic the constituency structure that in fact existed from 1265 to 1885 and did not finally disappear in some places in the UK until 1950.

Major parties would most likely run two candidates in each constituency, although it is not a requirement. If two, candidates for a party could run together as primary and secondary in an effectively closed list, similarly as in the [[Dual member proportional]] system, or they could run separately. Parties might choose the later option in an open seat or in a hopeless seat, to effectively combine a primary with the general election.

It is recommended that voters employ a preferential 1,2,3, etc vote, for reasons discussed below, although an "X" would also be deemed a valid vote.

Counting would proceed in a constituency similarly to FPTP, except where candidates from the same party were running separately, in which case they would first have their combined vote total aggregated and assigned to their party. The party vote totals and those for any individual independent candidates in the constituency would then be forwarded to the national counting centre, one for each of the four UK constituent nations.

Upon receipt, these totals would be aggregated party-wise and the squares of the totals computed, ultimately producing,in each nation, party percentages relative to the sum of these squares. The normal vote percentages would naturally also be calculated and published, just as now.

In each nation, the squared percentages calculated above would be applied to the national seat total to estimate the number of seats won by each party. Largest remainder would be used to assign fractional seats. Note that the ultimate result may vary slightly from these figures, for reasons outlined later.

Again, similarly to FPTP, the candidate who tops the poll will be declared elected by the local returning officer. In the case of two running on a closed list the primary candidate will be elected. Additionally, any other candidate (or list) that exceeds the Droop quota will also be declared elected. In a few cases, mostly inner-city Labour seats, a party may obtain two Droop quotas - more than 66.67% - in which case both candidates of that party are elected, and the seat closed. A little over half the MPs should be elected in this manner, and election night coverage by TV networks would initially not look too different to what it does under FPTP.

In the case where two party candidates are running separately, and their combined party vote either wins a plurality over all other party votes, or it exceeds the quota, a further STV-style count must be employed later, once the full complexion of the constituency is discerned, to distinguish the winning candidate(s). Such instances should be comparatively rare.

The novel part of the process really begins here. At the national count centre, the ordinary party vote percentages in each constituency for the first and second ranked parties are then normalised relative to the Droop quota, disregarding any integer part. For example, if Party A obtained 45% and Party B obtained 25%, these would translate to approximately 0.35 and 0.75 "remainder" quotas respectively.

In simple terms, the number of seats already won by each party on the first count is deducted from their national seat allocation and the ''n'' best remainder quotas for each party are assigned to the relevant constituencies as the second seats. Some parties may end up winning both seats as a result, while strong second places will also be rewarded.

It may be that an local independent or micro-party, with no prospect of national seat allocation, makes a breakthrough to quota or plurality in a particular constituency, and hence wins a seat. This is an admirable feature, not a bug, of the system, although its incidence may only be marginally higher than under FPTP.

In such case, the parties' national seat allocation would require to be re-computed, after deducting a seat from the national total initially available. Such adjustments would be automatically calculated by national counting centre and TV network computers.

The system, by virtue of the mathematics of squaring, will generate nominal "natural thresholds" for each of the four nations. The actual figures will vary slightly, depending on the precise distribution of votes for the parties, but they are approximately: