Vote unitarity: Difference between revisions

add note on priceability
(→‎Rationale and Critique: more specific about when it's "harmful". It's still clearly a step up from reweighted/satisfaction methods.)
(add note on priceability)
 
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==History==
 
[[Keith Edmonds]] saw a unification of [[Proportional representation|Proportional Representation]] and the concept of one person one vote which was maintained throughout winner the winner selection method. He coined the term "vote unitarity" for the second concept.<ref>https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/electionscience/Tzt_z6pBt8A</ref> and designed a score reweighting system which satisfied both Hare Quota Criterion and Vote Unitarity. As such it would preserve the amount of score used through sequential rounds while attributing representation in a partitioned way. It would assign Hare Quotas of score to winners which allowed for a voters influence to be spread over multiple winners. The final system was originally proposed in a late stage of the [[W: 2018 British Columbia electoral reform referendum]] but was not selected for the referendum ballot. This system, [[Sequentially Spent Score]], was the first sequential [[Multi-Member System | Multi-Winner]] [[Cardinal voting systems |Cardinal Voting System]] built on [[Score voting|Score Voting]] ballots to satisfy Vote Unitarity. Variants were soon found.
 
== Definitions: ==
Vote Weight = The weight and worth of a person's vote. The amount of power that a voter has to elect candidates in each round. Ballots are fully weighted at the beginning of tabulation, and ballots may be reweighted to reflect that some or all of a vote's weight has been spent to win representation.
 
== Priceability ==
Vote Unitarity is related to the more recent concept of [[priceability]]<ref>D. Peters and P. Skowron. Proportionality and the limits of welfarism. In Proceedings of the 2020 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pages 793–794, 2020. Extended version [https://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.11747.pdf arXiv:1911.11747].</ref> A committee is priceable if there is a price such that voter spending can be arranged in such a way that each committee member gets a total spending of exactly the price, and voters do not have enough money left to buy additional candidates. The intuition behind this condition is that it encodes that each voter has (approximately) equal influence on the committee (since each voter starts out with an equal budget), and this ensures proportionality.
 
== References ==
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