Vote unitarity: Difference between revisions
→Rationale and Critique: more specific about when it's "harmful". It's still clearly a step up from reweighted/satisfaction methods.
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# Following the same example, if a rating of 3 out of 5 has more than 3/5 the power to elect a candidate in the first place, the strategic incentive is to give lower ratings, so that the amount of your ballot that is used up when a candidate is elected is less than the voting power you exerted in electing them.
This leads some voting theorists, such as Jameson Quinn, to consider vote unitarity an actively harmful criterion, as opposed to otherwise-similar methods which tend to allocate votes more fully.
== Compliant Voting Methods ==
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