Woodall's method: Difference between revisions
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Definition of "beats": |
Definition of "beats": |
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{{definition|X beats Y if more ballots rank X over Y than rank Y over X.}} |
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{{definition|X beats Y if more ballots rank X over Y than rank Y over X.}}An alternative (but equivalent) definition of Woodall's used in James Green-Armytage's Condorcet-IRV paper<ref>http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE29/I29P1.PDF</ref>:<blockquote>Score candidates according to their elimination scores, and choose the Smith set candidate with best score. That is, define each candidate’s elimination score as the round in which he is eliminated by AV [IRV].</blockquote> |
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=== A few properties of Woodall === |
=== A few properties of Woodall === |
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Meeting Smith always implies meeting MMC, and Condorcet Loser as well. |
Meeting Smith always implies meeting MMC, and Condorcet Loser as well. |
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Woodall doesn't meet [[FBC]]. FBC is necessary only under current conditions (dishonest, disinformational media, and an electorate who believe those media). Woodall isn't proposed for current conditions. Likewise for the similar methods proposed later at this page. |
Woodall doesn't meet [[FBC]]. FBC is necessary only under current conditions (dishonest, disinformational media, and an electorate who believe those media). Woodall isn't proposed for current conditions. Likewise for the similar methods proposed later at this page. |
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Consistency criteria: Woodall, like all Condorcet methods, fails Consistency, Participation, Mono-Add-Top, and Mono-Add-Unique-Top. Woodall fails Mono-Raise, but passes Mono-Add-Plump and Mono-Append. |
Consistency criteria: Woodall, like all Condorcet methods, fails Consistency, Participation, Mono-Add-Top, and Mono-Add-Unique-Top. Woodall fails Mono-Raise, but passes Mono-Add-Plump and Mono-Append. |
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Woodall's importance comes from its unmatched freedom from strategy-need, made possible by MMC, freedom from chicken dilemma, and CC. Advantages such as that come at a price. The |
Woodall's importance comes from its unmatched freedom from strategy-need, made possible by MMC, freedom from chicken dilemma, and CC. Advantages such as that come at a price. The above-mentioned combination of properties appears to be incompatible with FBC and with Mono-Raise, Participation, Mono-Add-Top and Mono-Add-Unique top. Choice of a voting system always involves choice among properties. |
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The consistency criteria don't have strategic importance. |
The consistency criteria don't have strategic importance. |
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It should be pointed out that, of course, if there is a CW, then |
It should be pointed out that, of course, if there is a CW, then |
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Woodall and Benham, by their above-stated definitions, will elect that |
Woodall and Benham, by their above-stated definitions, will elect that |
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CW without doing any IRV. |
CW without doing any IRV. |
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For current conditions (disinformational media and an electorate who |
For current conditions (disinformational media and an electorate who |
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believe those media), [[FBC]] is necessary. |
believe those media), [[FBC]] is necessary. |
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== Schwartz Woodall == |
== Schwartz Woodall == |
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{{Merge to|Schwartz Woodall|date=August 2019}} |
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Schwartz Woodall is a variation of Woodall, and an improvement for |
Schwartz Woodall is a variation of Woodall, and an improvement for |
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small electorates, such as organizations, meetings or families. |
small electorates, such as organizations, meetings or families. |
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3. The Schwartz set is the set of candidates who are in innermost unbeaten sets.}} |
3. The Schwartz set is the set of candidates who are in innermost unbeaten sets.}} |
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[[Category: |
[[Category:Condorcet methods]] |
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[[Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] |
[[Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] |
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