Woodall's method: Difference between revisions
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imported>MichaelOssipoff (Created page with " == '''Definitions and Important Properties of Woodall's Method and Two Similar Methods''' == '''Woodall's method:''' Do IRV till only one member of the initial Smiths s...") |
imported>MichaelOssipoff No edit summary |
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Do IRV till only one member of the initial Smiths set remains |
Do IRV till only one member of the initial Smiths set remains |
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un-eliminated. Elect hir. |
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[end of Woodall definition] |
[end of Woodall definition] |
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The Smith set is the smallest set of candidates such that every |
The Smith set is the smallest set of candidates such that every |
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candidate in the set beats every candidate outside the set. |
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[end of Smith set definition] |
[end of Smith set definition] |
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Repeatedly, cross-off or delete from the rankings the candidate who |
Repeatedly, cross-off or delete from the rankings the candidate who |
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tops the fewest rankings. |
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[end of IRV definition for the purpose of Woodall] |
[end of IRV definition for the purpose of Woodall] |
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A mutual majority (MM) is a set of voters comprising a majority of the |
A mutual majority (MM) is a set of voters comprising a majority of the |
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voters, who all prefer some same set of candidates to all of the other |
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candidates. That set of candidates is their MM-preferred set. |
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If a MM vote sincerely, then the winner should come from their MM-preferred set. |
If a MM vote sincerely, then the winner should come from their MM-preferred set. |
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A voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't vote an unfelt preference, or |
A voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't vote an unfelt preference, or |
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fail to vote a felt preference that the balloting system in use would |
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have allowed hir to vote in addition to the preferences that she |
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actually does vote. |
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To vote an unfelt preference is to vote X over Y if you prefer X to Y. |
To vote an unfelt preference is to vote X over Y if you prefer X to Y. |
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As with IRV, Woodall's MMC compliance and freedom from chicken dilemma |
As with IRV, Woodall's MMC compliance and freedom from chicken dilemma |
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mean that a MM have no need to not rank sincerely. They can, by merely |
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ranking sincerely, ensure that the winner will come from their |
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MM-preferred set. They can assure that, even while fully, freely and sincerely choosing |
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_among_ that MM preferred set by sincere ranking. And freedom from |
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chicken dilemma means that that MM have no need to not rank sincerely. |
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Therefore, IRV and Woodall guarantee automatic majority-rule |
Therefore, IRV and Woodall guarantee automatic majority-rule |
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enforcement for a mutual majority. |
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But Woodall additionally, as well as possible, guarantees automatic |
But Woodall additionally, as well as possible, guarantees automatic |
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majority rule to _all_ majorities, however constituted, by always |
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electing the voted Condorcet winner (CW) |
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The voted CW is the candidate (when there is one) who beats each one |
The voted CW is the candidate (when there is one) who beats each one |
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of the other candidates (as "beat" was defined above). |
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Benham is a method similar to Woodall. Benham can be defined a bit |
Benham is a method similar to Woodall. Benham can be defined a bit |
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more briefly, because it doesn't mention the Smith set, though Benham, |
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like Woodall, always chooses from the Smith set. But Woodall is more |
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particular than Benham is, regarding which Smith set member it |
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chooses. |
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Benham: |
Benham: |
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Do IRV till there is an un-eliminated candidate who beats each one of |
Do IRV till there is an un-eliminated candidate who beats each one of |
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the other un-eliminated candidates. Elect hir. |
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[end of Benham definition] |
[end of Benham definition] |
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It should be pointed out that, of course, if there is a CW, then |
It should be pointed out that, of course, if there is a CW, then |
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Woodall and Benham, by their above-stated definitions, will elect that |
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CW without doing any IRV. |
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For current conditions (disinformational media and an electorate who |
For current conditions (disinformational media and an electorate who |
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believe those media), [[FBC]] is necessary. |
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[[Approval]], [[Score]] ("[[Range]]"), and |
[[Approval]], [[Score]] ("[[Range]]"), and |
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[[Symmetrical ICT]] meet FBC, and are good proposals for current |
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conditions. |
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FBC is important only for current conditions. |
FBC is important only for current conditions. |
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But, other than for current conditions, FBC would no longer be needed, |
But, other than for current conditions, FBC would no longer be needed, |
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and then the powerful above-described properties-combinations of IRV, Woodall, and |
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Benham become important and decisive. |
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Schwartz Woodall is a variation of Woodall, and an improvement for |
Schwartz Woodall is a variation of Woodall, and an improvement for |
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small electorates, such as organizations, meetings or families. |
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Schwartz Woodall: |
Schwartz Woodall: |
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Do IRV till only one member of the initial Schwartz set remains |
Do IRV till only one member of the initial Schwartz set remains |
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un-eliminated. Elect hir. |
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[end of Schwartz Woodall definition] |
[end of Schwartz Woodall definition] |
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There is a beatpath from X to Y if X beats Y, or if X beats something |
There is a beatpath from X to Y if X beats Y, or if X beats something |
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that has a beatpath to Y. |
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X has a beatpath to Y if there is a beatpath from X to Y. |
X has a beatpath to Y if there is a beatpath from X to Y. |
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X is in the Schwartz set if there is no Y such that there is a |
X is in the Schwartz set if there is no Y such that there is a |
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beatpath from Y to X, but not from X to Y. |
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[end of beatpath definition of the Schwartz set] |
[end of beatpath definition of the Schwartz set] |
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1. An unbeaten set is a set of candidates none of whom are beaten by |
1. An unbeaten set is a set of candidates none of whom are beaten by |
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anyone outside that set. |
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2. An innermost unbeaten set is an unbeaten set that doesn't contain a |
2. An innermost unbeaten set is an unbeaten set that doesn't contain a |
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smaller unbeaten set. |
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3. The Schwartz set is the set of candidates who are in innermost unbeaten sets. |
3. The Schwartz set is the set of candidates who are in innermost unbeaten sets. |