0-info Later-No-Help: Difference between revisions

(abbreviated ZLNHe. LNHe stands for [[Later-No-Help]])

== Definition of ZLNHe ==

'''Supporting definitions:'''

{{definition|In a 0-info election, voting above bottom one or more of some certain set of candidates shouldn't decrease the probability that the winner will come from that set, as compared to voting them all at bottom.}}

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elections. Therefore, ZLNHe is nearly the same thing as LNHe, and the

word "weakening" hardly even applies. I suggest that, with a voting system complying with ZLNHe or Strong ZLNHe, there's no need to vote for unacceptable candidates. (just as can be said for methods complying with the slightly stronger LNHe).

== Definition of Strong ZLNHe ==

So, instead of a failure of a 0-info probabilistic Later-No-Harm, a compliance with Strong ZLNHe is more relevantly regarded as a compliance with a stronger and more reassuring 0-info probabilistic Later-No-Help.

Methods that comply with LNHe include [[Approval voting]], Score Voting (also called [[Range voting]]), and IRV.

Ordinary ICT, and traditional Condorcet methods don't comply with LNHe, ZLNHe or Strong ZLNHe.

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== Definition of Later-No-Help (LNHe) ==

To fully help a candidate is to vote in a way that does as much as possible toward making him/her win.

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== Commentary ==

Some methods that don't strictly meet LNHe can meet ZLNHe and maybe Strong ZLNHe. For example, Symmetrical ICT meets Strong ZLNHe, though it doesn't strictly meet LNHe. ZLNHe and Strong ZLNHe are the zero-information counterparts to LNHe. I claim that methods complying with ZLNHe, or especially Strong ZLNHe, for practical purposes, don't need bottom-end strategy.

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== A Few Compliance Demonstrations ==

In [[Symmetrical ICT]], bottom-voting X and Y (typically done by not ranking them)

that the winner will come from {X,Y}.

In a large official public election, pairwise ties are vanishingly

[end of compliance and noncompliance demonstrations]

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suggesting something about likely beaten-ness of X and Y by other candidates.

That could tend to make some strategic incentive to