Approval Sorted Margins: Difference between revisions

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* Abby is the least-approved strong candidate and defeats Erin directly. So Abby is the MRAV winner.

== ~~Properties~~ ==

== Satisfied Criteria ==

Approval Sorted Margins satisfies the Condorcet Criterion, Monotonicity Criterion, Independence from Clones Criterion. The method is both symmetric and summable.

Approval Sorted Margins satisfies the following criteria:

# [[Mutual majority criterion]]

# [[Monotonicity criterion]]

# [[Pareto criterion]]

# [[Condorcet Criterion|Condorcet criterion]]

# [[Smith set|Smith criterion]] (a.k.a. [[Generalized Condorcet criterion]])

# [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|local independence from irrelevant alternatives]]

# [[Plurality criterion]]

# the winner is always chosen from the [[Immune set]]

# the winner is always chosen from the [[CDTT|CDTT set]]

# [[Minimal Defense criterion]]

# [[Strategy-Free criterion]]

# [[Generalized Strategy-Free criterion]]

# [[Strong Defensive Strategy criterion]]

# [[Weak Defensive Strategy criterion]]

# [[Summability criterion]]

# [[Strategic nomination|Independence of clones]]

# [[Neutrality of Spoiled Ballots]]

Approval Sorted Margins violates the following criteria:

# [[Participation criterion]]

# [[Consistency|Consistency criterion]]

# [[Tactical voting|invulnerability to compromising]]

# [[Tactical voting|invulnerability to burying]]

# [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]]

# [[Later-no-harm criterion]]

''(TODO: check and find examples)''

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