Approval voting: Difference between revisions
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{{see also|Approval ballot}}
{{wikipedia}}
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*Knoxville: 32
==== Indeterminacy of
In certain elections, honest voters merely varying the cut-off where they give approval can lead to any particular candidate winning.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Saari|first=Donald G.|last2=Jill|first2=Van Newenhizen|year=1988|title=The problem of indeterminancy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems|journal=Public Choice|volume=59|issue=2|pages=101–120|doi=10.1007/BF00054447|jstor=30024954}}</ref> Consider an election with 15 voters deciding among three candidates (A, B, C). The voters have the preferences
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Approval voting advocates say this is a positive feature of approval voting, saying that the above example "demonstrates that AV responds positively to distinctions voters make among candidates that ordinal preference rankings do not mirror".<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brams|first=Steven J.|last2=Fishburn|first2=Peter C.|last3=Merrill|first3=Samuel|author-mask3=Merrill, Samuel, III|year=1988|title=The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen|journal=Public Choice|volume=59|pages=121–131|doi=10.1007/BF00054448}}</ref> That is, approval voting allows voters to better express their degree of approval. One example of such a situation is where we replace the CBA voter preferences with {C: 2.1, B: 2, A: 0}; in this case, it would be appropriate for B to win, as the CBA voters think C and B nearly equivalent.
Richard Niemi argues that since approval voting may elect any of a large number of candidates under strategy with non-dichotomous preferences, the method "almost begs voters to behave strategically", as the outcome depends on just what kind of strategy is used.<ref name="Niemi 1984 pp. 952–958">{{cite journal | last=Niemi | first=Richard G. | title=The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting | journal=The American Political Science Review | publisher=[American Political Science Association, Cambridge University Press] | volume=78 | issue=4 | year=1984 | issn=00030554, 15375943 | jstor=1955800 | pages=952–958 | url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/1955800 | access-date=2022-07-03}}</ref>
==Effect on elections==
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[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]]
[[Category:Approval
[[Category:Favorite betrayal criterion]]
[[Category:Binary voting methods]]
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[[Category:Self-referential Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]]
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:No-favorite-betrayal electoral systems]]
[[Category:Clone-independent electoral systems]]
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