Benham's method: Difference between revisions
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Because Benham's method is just IRV with the possibility of ending in an earlier round, it is possible to figure out who the Benham winner would be if given the full results of an IRV election (the round-by-round breakdown) and the pairwise comparison table for that election. |
Because Benham's method is just IRV with the possibility of ending in an earlier round, it is possible to figure out who the Benham winner would be if given the full results of an IRV election (the round-by-round breakdown) and the pairwise comparison table for that election. |
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Like other |
Like other deterministic voting methods, Benham's method is vulnerable to [[tactical voting]]. The combination of Condorcet and IRV principles leads to what may be considered a conflicting mechanism: on the one hand, first place votes are ignored when there's a Condorcet winner; on the other, they're all that matters when there's no Condorcet winner. However, these principles may also cover each other's weak spots, thus in part explaining Benham's unusual strategy resistance. |
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Benham is cloneproof for the same reason that IRV is: suppose the winner is X and is cloned. Then these clones can't have higher first preference counts than X itself, and so all appear after X. When all of these clones but one has been eliminated, then X still wins. The introduction of clones may lead to Benham needing more rounds to determine the winner, however. |
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== References == |
== References == |
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[[Category:Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]] |
[[Category:Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]] |
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[[Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] |
[[Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] |
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[[Category:Clone-independent electoral systems]] |
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