Borda count: Difference between revisions
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(Added an example of an MBC decision.) |
(Tactical voting in an MBC) |
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==Potential for tactical voting== |
==Potential for BC tactical voting== |
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Like most voting methods, The Borda count is vulnerable to compromising. That is, voters can help avoid the election of a less-preferred candidate by insincerely raising the position of a more-preferred candidate on their ballot. |
Like most voting methods, The Borda count is vulnerable to compromising. That is, voters can help avoid the election of a less-preferred candidate by insincerely raising the position of a more-preferred candidate on their ballot. |
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In response to the issue of strategic manipulation in the Borda count, M. de Borda said "My scheme is only intended for honest men." |
In response to the issue of strategic manipulation in the Borda count, M. de Borda said "My scheme is only intended for honest men." |
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<big><u>Tactical voting in decision-making in an MBC</u></big> |
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In majority voting, the two options listed are (regarded as being) mutually exclusive. So it is that, for example, in the Balkans, the 1991 referendum - "Are you Serb or Croat?" - disenfranchised any partner in, or adult child of, a mixed relationship... or anyone who wanted to vote for a compromise, or more importantly, for peace. |
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In an MBC of, say, five options, not every option will be totally mutually exclusive of all the other options. If, then, the two winning options are 'neck-and-neck', a composite may be formed based on the most popular option, as amended by those parts of the runner-up which are compatible with the winning option. The voter's 2nd preference should therefore best be his/her actual desire. As the old saying goes, "be careful what you wish for." |
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==Effect on factions and candidates== |
==Effect on factions and candidates== |