Cardinal voting systems: Difference between revisions

Content added Content deleted
(→‎Sequential Systems: Updated to clarify terms and context.)
Line 26: Line 26:
It is worth noting why [[Approval Voting]] does not lead to a tyranny of a centrist majority situation. There is difference between a tendency towards a moderate or compromise candidate and a majority candidate. For example, if there is a small group in desire of representation then the candidates would gain approval if they could add the desires of this group to their platform. This means issues that are neutral to the centrist majority and highly relevant to a small group are important for candidates to understand. Additionally, if the overlap of votes is released then the candidates can study the results to determine which candidates represented an isolated group. For example, if there were a candidate who only received votes because of a particular issue, then all candidates would be wise to integrate this issue into their platform for the next election to be more competitive. However, a case can be made that candidates are incentivized to make promised to special interest groups which benefit the few a lot but do not hurt the majority enough for them to get mobilized. In many instances, like with tax code, this effect lowers the total prosperity of the society at large. This effect certainly exists in other systems and it has not been empirically shown that it is more problematic in Approval Voting.
It is worth noting why [[Approval Voting]] does not lead to a tyranny of a centrist majority situation. There is difference between a tendency towards a moderate or compromise candidate and a majority candidate. For example, if there is a small group in desire of representation then the candidates would gain approval if they could add the desires of this group to their platform. This means issues that are neutral to the centrist majority and highly relevant to a small group are important for candidates to understand. Additionally, if the overlap of votes is released then the candidates can study the results to determine which candidates represented an isolated group. For example, if there were a candidate who only received votes because of a particular issue, then all candidates would be wise to integrate this issue into their platform for the next election to be more competitive. However, a case can be made that candidates are incentivized to make promised to special interest groups which benefit the few a lot but do not hurt the majority enough for them to get mobilized. In many instances, like with tax code, this effect lowers the total prosperity of the society at large. This effect certainly exists in other systems and it has not been empirically shown that it is more problematic in Approval Voting.


== Determining relative accuracy or utility between voting methods ==
== Determining Relative Accuracy or Utility Between Voting Methods ==
[[Score voting]] has the lowest [[Bayesian Regret]] among all common single-winner election methods which have been tested. (STAR Voting has not been included in Bayesian Regret studies to date.) [[Bayesian regret|Bayesian Regret]] is a measure of how the second order consequences of using a system affects the population. It can be thought of as the quantifiable amount of “expected avoidable human unhappiness.” It draws its merit from utilitarianism which intends to optimize for the total amount across the population. This is opposed by the theory of majority rule which intends to optimize only for the majority.
[[Score voting]] has the lowest [[Bayesian Regret]] among all common single-winner election methods which have been tested. (STAR Voting has not been included in Bayesian Regret studies to date.) [[Bayesian regret|Bayesian Regret]] is a measure of how the second order consequences of using a system affects the population. It can be thought of as the quantifiable amount of “expected avoidable human unhappiness.” It draws its merit from utilitarianism which intends to optimize for the total amount across the population. This is opposed by the theory of majority rule which intends to optimize only for the majority.


[http://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ Voter Satisfaction Efficiency] (VSE) is a newer model which has been used to evaluate voting method utility. VSE is an inverse of Bayesian Regret, with higher scores representing better utility. STAR Voting was found to have the highest Voter Satisfaction Efficiency rating overall.
[http://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ Voter Satisfaction Efficiency] (VSE) is a newer model which has been used to evaluate voting method utility. VSE is an inverse of Bayesian Regret, with higher scores representing better utility. STAR Voting was found to have the highest Voter Satisfaction Efficiency rating overall.


== [[Single Member systems]] ==
== [[Single Member systems|Single Member Systems]] ==




Line 57: Line 57:
* '''Bloc Score Voting''': Each voter scores all the candidates on a scale with three or more units. Starting the scale at zero is preferable. Add all the scores. Elect the candidates with the highest total score until all positions are filled.
* '''Bloc Score Voting''': Each voter scores all the candidates on a scale with three or more units. Starting the scale at zero is preferable. Add all the scores. Elect the candidates with the highest total score until all positions are filled.
* '''Bloc STAR Voting''': Each voter scores all the candidates on a scale from 0-5. All the scores are added and the two highest scoring candidates advance to an automatic runoff. The finalist who was preferred by (scored higher by) more voters wins the first seat. The next two highest scoring candidates then runoff, with the finalist preferred by more voters winning the next seat. This process continues until all positions are filled.
* '''Bloc STAR Voting''': Each voter scores all the candidates on a scale from 0-5. All the scores are added and the two highest scoring candidates advance to an automatic runoff. The finalist who was preferred by (scored higher by) more voters wins the first seat. The next two highest scoring candidates then runoff, with the finalist preferred by more voters winning the next seat. This process continues until all positions are filled.
===Sequential Systems===
===Sequential [https://electowiki.org/wiki/Proportional_representation Proportional] Systems===


Sequential Cardinal Systems can be defined by a selection and a reweighting mechanism. Fist the selection is applied to find the first winner then the reweighting before the selection again to find the next winner. The selection system is similar to an aggregation method but it need not select by the maximum of that aggregation alone and can be more complicated. A reweighting is applied to either the ballot or the scores for the ballot itself. The purpose of the reweighting phase is to ensure that the [[Proportional representation| Hare Quota Criterion]]
Sequential Cardinal Systems elect winners one at a time in sequence using a candidate selection method and a reweighting mechanism. The single-winner version of the selection is applied to find the first winner, then a reweighting is applied before the selection of the next and subsequent winners. A reweighting is applied to either the ballot or the scores for the ballot itself. The purpose of the reweighting phase is to ensure that the[[Proportional representation| Hare Quota Criterion]] is met to ensure proportional election outcomes.


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
Line 78: Line 78:
|}
|}


=== Optimal Systems ===
=== Optimal [https://electowiki.org/wiki/Proportional_representation Proportional] Systems ===
* [https://rangevoting.org/QualityMulti.html Harmonic Voting]
* [https://rangevoting.org/QualityMulti.html Harmonic Voting]
* [[Proportional approval voting]]
* [[Proportional approval voting]]