Center squeeze: Difference between revisions

Center squeeze (view source)

Revision as of 10:35, 1 January 2021

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→‎Prevalence: attempting to purposefully induce a Condorcet cycle is incredibly risky and complicated, and it's hard to imagine that a large enough group of voters would engage in the strategy without it backfiring.

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RobLa

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Revision as of 10:23, 1 January 2021 (view source) RobLa (talk \| contribs) (+Category:Voter strategy) ← Older edit		Revision as of 10:35, 1 January 2021 (view source) RobLa (talk \| contribs) (→‎Prevalence: attempting to purposefully induce a Condorcet cycle is incredibly risky and complicated, and it's hard to imagine that a large enough group of voters would engage in the strategy without it backfiring.) Tag: Visual edit Newer edit →
Line 53: Systems that can do either well or poorly in a center squeeze situation include most [[graded Bucklin]] systems and [[score voting]]. Systems that generally do well with center squeeze include [[Condorcet method\|Condorcet systems]]. ~~(although~~ inSome ~~some~~people ~~cases,~~suggest that a center squeeze scenario could become an opportunity for one of the wings to use burial strategy and create an artificial [[Condorcet paradox\|Condorcet cycle]]). However, a Condorcet cycle has yet to to be documented in a real-world set of ranked ballots, and purposefully trying to inducing a cycle by voting for less-preferred candidates risks getting the less-preferred candidates elected. == Effect of strategy ==