Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions

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Most [[:Category:Defeat-dropping Condorcet methods|defeat-dropping Condorcet methods]], [[Rated method|rated methods]], and to some extent, [[:Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods]] fail the criterion.

[[Reciprocal Score Voting]] would not give the Democrats a benefit by not supporting the Greens, as they would get no support themselves. ~~Presumably~~, if a significant portion of Green Party voters support Democrats then a significant portion of Democrats would also support Greens, as the overlap between voter bases should be mostly symmetrical. Therefore, it ~~cam~~ be argued such strong asymmetries are unrealistic to begin with.

[[Reciprocal Score Voting]] would not give the Democrats a benefit by not supporting the Greens, as they would get no support themselves, so this is not a valid strategy then. Such situations would necessarily have to be honest. But presumably, if a significant portion of Green Party voters support Democrats then a significant portion of Democrats would also support Greens, as the overlap between voter bases should be mostly symmetrical. Therefore, it can be argued such strong asymmetries are unrealistic to begin with, and the system should encourage this mutual support to appear whenever it exists.

See also [[Asset voting]] for some discussion on this; the majority can be thought of as a "majority semi-solid coalition".