Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions
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imported>Homunq (general talk about chicken dilemma first) |
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There are various ways to deal with this situation. For instance: |
There are various ways to deal with this situation. For instance: |
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# Some voting systems, such as approval voting, ignore the problem. Perhaps the assumption here is that it will be impossible to organize a defection without prompting a retaliation, and thus that both sides will prefer to cooperate. ("Mutual assured destruction"?) |
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# Some voting systems, such as [[Majority Choice Approval]], try exploit the fact that each faction is not a single coordinated entity, but a group of individual voters. The idea is that if a small number of voters defect, they should be ignored; hopefully, in that situation, majority cooperation will be a stable strategy. |
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# Other voting systems, such as [[ICT]], try to exploit the fact that in a real-world election, A and B are never perfectly balanced; one subfaction is always larger. In this case, a voting system can encourage the smaller group to cooperate by threatening to elect C (punishing both groups) if the smaller group defects. The criterion below is passed only by this kind of voting system. |
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== Definition == |
== Definition == |