Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions
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'''Supporting definitions:'''
1. The A voters are the voters who prefer candidate A to everyone else. The B voters are the voters who prefer candidate B to everyone else. The C voters are the voters who prefer C to everyone else.
▲3. A particular voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't falsify a
preference, or fail to vote a felt preference that the balloting
system in use would have allowed hir to vote in addition to the
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'''Premise:'''
1. There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
1. The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half▼
of the voters in the election.
other words, if the B voters voted sincerely, as do all the other
voters).
7. The C voters are indifferent between A and B, and vote neither over the other.
'''Requirement:'''
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'''Some methods that pass the Chicken Dilemma Criterion:'''
ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]]
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Revision as of 16:28, 9 January 2014
Definition
Supporting definitions:
1. The A voters are the voters who prefer candidate A to everyone else. The B voters are the voters who prefer candidate B to everyone else. The C voters are the voters who prefer C to everyone else.
2. A particular voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't falsify a preference, or fail to vote a felt preference that the balloting system in use would have allowed hir to vote in addition to the preferences that s/he actually votes.
Premise:
1. There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
2. The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in the election.
3. The A voters and the B voters all prefer both A and B to C.
4. The A voters are more numerous than are the B voters.
5. Voting is sincere, except that the B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.
6. Candidate A would be the unique winner under sincere voting (...in other words, if the B voters voted sincerely, as do all the other voters).
7. The C voters are indifferent between A and B, and vote neither over the other.
Requirement:
B doesn't win.
[end of CD definition]
In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD) defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' co-operativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the candidates disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they helped {A,B} against worse candidates. But, with methods that fail CD, the message is "You help, you lose".
Some methods that pass the Chicken Dilemma Criterion:
ICT, Symmetrical ICT, MMPO, MDDTR, IRV, Benham's method, Woodall's method