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[[Category:Condorcet methods]]▼
▲These are [[Condorcet methods]] that use [[Cardinal voting|cardinal methods]] a.k.a graded voting ([[Approval voting]], [[Score voting]], etc.) to resolve [[Condorcet cycle|cycles]].
== Comparisons ==
One of the strongest reasons to prefer rated Condorcet methods to other Condorcet methods is that they can do better than other Condorcet methods in situations where cycles are strategically induced because they allow voters to prioritize which pairwise matchups they want to win. In the below example, the top line of voters honestly voted A>C>B>D, making C the Condorcet winner. But...:<blockquote>Now '''A'''<nowiki/>'s 6 supporters naturally are not happy about that. What can they do to make their man win? There is one, and basically only one, change to their "A>C>B>D" vote they can make which causes A to win. That is to "bury" C with "A>B>D>C." (Well, the alternate burials A>D>B>C and A>D>C>B also work in this example, but they both are at-least-as-dishonest votes and anyway still count as burying C.) If they do this, we get
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Most [[strategic voting]] in these methods revolves around [[burying]] a rival candidate and making your preferred candidate enter the [[Smith set]], where they might win by having more points/approvals.
Rated Condorcet methods have a stronger resistance to [[center squeeze]] than [[:Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]], because even when an artificial/strategic cycle is created, voters can rate the center candidate highly to make them win, rather than have the center candidate automatically eliminated unless they Favorite Betray.
Point of comparison between rated Condorcet methods and regular rated methods: if a [[mutual majority]] wish to make one of their preferred candidates win in a rated method, they must show maximal support for all of their candidates, not showing any distinction in preference between any of their candidates, and no support to any other candidates. By contrast, in a rated Condorcet method, because many of them pass the [[Smith criterion]], the majority need only vote honestly to make their preferred candidates win, and can also show their preferences among all candidates. This further means that a minority that wants to maximally push for its preferred candidates can do so while showing preference among the majority's candidates without risking its own chances of winning as much.
Condorcet+cardinal methods that use [[rated ballots]] can sometimes benefit from the addition of an [[approval threshold]]. This is because if the score itself is used to determine both ranking and cardinal support, then a voter wishing to rank three candidates consecutively will have to give at least some support to their 2nd choice candidate. Using an approval threshold allows the voter to use the scores to rank the candidates and the approvals to express their rated support only for those candidates they want.
See [[rated pairwise preference ballot]] for ways to use cardinal information to decide the strength of each pairwise matchup.
[[Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|*]]
[[Category:Cardinal voting methods]]
▲[[Category:Condorcet methods]]
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