Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions

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Black, [[Condorcet//Approval]], Smith/IRV, [[Copeland's method|Copeland]], [[Llull-Approval Voting]], [[Minmax]], Smith/Minmax, [[ranked pairs]] and variations ([[maximize affirmed majorities]], [[maximum majority voting]]), and [[Schulze method|Schulze]] comply with the Condorcet criterion.

It has been recently argued that the definition of the verb "beat" should be regarded as external to the Condorcet Criterion...and that "beat should be defined in a way that interprets equal-top ranking consistent with the actual preferences, intent and wishes of the equal-top-ranking voters. When such a definition of "beat" is used in the Condorcet Criterion definition, then the Condorcet Criterion is compatible with FBC, and there are Condorcet methods that pass FBC. Discussion and arguments on that matter can be found at the [[Symmetrical ICT]] article.

It has been recently argued that the definition of the verb "beat" should be regarded as external to the Condorcet Criterion...and that "beat should be defined in a way that interprets equal-top ranking consistent with the actual preferences, intent and wishes of the equal-top-ranking voters. When such a definition of "beat" is used in the Condorcet Criterion definition, then the Condorcet Criterion is compatible with [[FBC]], and there are Condorcet methods that pass [[FBC]]. Discussion and arguments on that matter can be found at the [[Symmetrical ICT]] article.

[[Approval voting]], [[Range voting]], [[Borda count]], [[plurality voting]], and [[instant-runoff voting]] do not.

[[Approval voting]], [[Range voting]], [[Borda count]], [[plurality voting]], and [[instant-runoff voting]] do not comply with the Condorcet Criterion.

==Commentary==