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Consecutive Runoff Approval Voting: Difference between revisions
Renamed Category:Approval methods to Category:Approval voting
imported>Robert K. Joyce (blues) No edit summary |
(Renamed Category:Approval methods to Category:Approval voting) |
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Perhaps some adjustment of the consecutive runoff approval voting method described below would be appropriate. This writer has been running tests using that method on political websites, and it has be found that many people holding the currently dominant perspectives are not prepared to accept a method that requires three consecutive runoffs. It is also challenging to construct an experimental straw poll that does not instigate arguments (or worse). What was found, however, is that more people are amenable to a method that only requires two consecutive runoffs.
It seems appropriate to make certain points that were brought up in the discussion of the three runoff method below. Consecutive runoff approval voting was designed to comply with three dominant principles: removal of the black hat syndrome (also called the spoiler syndrome), the ability to count a ballots at the voting station level in such a way as to produce simple numerical sums that can then be added into larger tabulations, thus avoiding any need to send any complex information to the larger tabulations, and achieving a method that provides extreme overall simplicity. It does seem to comply with these principles. The third principle that two-consecutive runoff voting is required to comply with is that it must harbor no black hat (spoiler) syndrome. This method always results in an absolute majority winner, so by some definitions, it may not constitute a "winner take all" method. The structure of the two runoff method is as follows.
TWO-CONSECUTIVE RUNOFF VOTING:
In the first runoff, the approval method is used to choose exactly two candidates to run in the second runoff. The first runoff is simply an approval election; each voter can give just one vote to as many candidates she or he "approves of," or finds acceptable. There is one practical consideration, however, due to the potential problem of voters casting an inordinate number of votes. So it would seem advantageous to limit the total number of votes that each voter can cast to some arbitrary number. A limit of 20 is suggested, but many people holding currently dominant perspectives seem to prefer a limit of 10. At the end of the polling, all of the votes are simply added up, and only the two candidates with the most votes go on to the second runoff.
The second runoff is quite simple; the two remaining candidates run against each other, and the one who achieves an absolute majority becomes the winner. Obviously, there can be no black hat (spoiler) syndrome, since there can be no third candidate.
The design of this method was undertaken with the express assumption that some interested party will often, if not always, attempt to use the black hat (spoiler) syndrome to circumvent the will of the voters. Therefor, we are not merely attempting to attain a method that precludes "voter strategies," but to gain a method that precludes the black hat (spoiler) syndrome from being exploited by dominant special interests. This is a somewhat subtle consideration, which only becomes more tricky if it is assumed that special interests will actively attempt to use this syndrome to manipulate elections.
It seems reasonable to assume that any ranked voting method will be susceptible to black hat manipulation, since it appears obvious that if special interests vigorously promote black hat candidates, voters will effectively be forced to cast their highest rank vote for whatever, generally minimally, acceptable candidate is perceived as likely to defeat the black hat candidates. In fact, this writer has engaged in countless discussions, in which it appeared that, with only four, at most, in a race, most (if not all) reasonably simple methods of ranked voting could enable a vote for a white hat candidate, from the perspective of some individual voter, to eventually lead to the actual election of a candidate that that individual voter perceives as a black hat. And this is a result that would have been avoided if the voter had given a gray hat candidate their highest rank vote. But at minimum, it seems reasonable to assume that a voter would tend to cast his or her first rank ballot for a likely-to-win gray hat candidate, rather than a "long shot" candidate, if a strong black hat is in the race. This would eventuate in the evolution of a closed two-party system.
Two-consecutive runoff voting cannot cause the situation in which a voter causing the election of a black hat by giving a high-rank vote a white hat, or even a case in which a voter perceives a need to give a high-rank vote to a gray hat in order to avoid the election of a black hat. And the obvious reason is that there are no ranks involved in this method. However a "gray hat" syndrome is present, in that, if a black hat is in the race, voters may feel some pressure to include some gray hats of "darker shades" in the first runoff if a black hat is in the race. However, this gray hat syndrome is vastly more benign than the black hat syndrome; for example, a voter could still vote for as many white hats as he or she desired.
It seems likely that the gray hat syndrome would be further ameliorated if a three runoff method is employed. On the other hand, this method requires three consecutive runoffs, which present-day online straw poll voters seem to dislike.
THREE-CONSECUTIVE RUNOFF VOTING:
Observe below that I use hardly any mathematical methods to describe Consecutive Runoff Approval Voting. This is probably because I work largely in natural language study, and have decided that whenever the potential number of criteria appears to exceed the number of methods they might be applied to, mathematical analyses tend to be less than fruitful. I do have one very prominent criterion, which is that any proposed system of voting should be completely free of the Black Hat Syndrome (or "spoiler effect"). I have concluded that every method is susceptible to a Gray Hat Syndrome, in which the presence of a Black Hat "ogre" candidate could cause the election of a Gray Hat, where a White hat would otherwise have been elected.
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This is really at the heart of the central dilemma of US politics. If you hope to have any influence on the ideological structure of US politics, you must capture one of two dominant parties, because the voting structure imposes a two party system. What distresses me more than anything is that virtually every political blogger around insists on courting a totally incorrect theory about why this is the case! This contention is that: ''"The winner take all system naturally reduces to 2 dominant parties and the Republicans were one of the two parties that survived"'' -- and this is just flat-out WRONG!!!
Careless thinking might lead us to see a ''winner take all syndrome'' as the cause of our inflexible two-party pseudo-democracy. BUT THAT IS TOTALLY WRONG. The real cause of the two-party pseudo-democracy is really the direct consequence of THE BLACK HAT SYNDROME! This Black Hat Syndrome (or "spoiler effect") is the outcome that results when we have a White Hat (relative to each individual voter -- say, for example, Ralph Nader), a Gray Hat (say, for example, John Kerry), and a Black Hat (say, for example, George W. Bush) in a political contest. You cannot vote for the White Hat without "sacrificing" the vote you would have otherwise used to fend
I will now provide
Consecutive Approval Voting ---
Round one of a Consecutive Approval Voting election is an approval, not a plurality method of election. Therefor, each voter gets to give just one vote to each candidate that she or he "approves of" (finds acceptable) up to twenty choices (so wacky people don't list thousands of candidates out of a phone book). From start to finish, parties are only advocacy networks; this voting system is "blind" to parties. So there can be no negotiating. Now, for example, Intelligent Greens will vote for some Democrats, as well as some greens. And intelligent Democrats will vote for some Greens, as well as some Democrats. So some Democrats and/or some greens will undoubtedly get a very high percentage of the maximum possible vote. Given a modicum of intelligence on the part of the voters, some Republicans would possibly get up to 40% of the maximum possible vote, supposing that Democrats could muster, say, 35%, and Greens held, say, 25% of the maximum possible vote. Now, the eight candidates who garner the most votes get to go to a second round.
The second round is, again, an approval contest between the eight remaining contenders. No negotiation between parties is allowed. Each voter can give exactly one vote to each of the eight remaining contenders that she or he "approves of" (finds acceptable). Once again the votes are added up, and the two candidates who have received the most votes go to the final round.
The final round is between only the two remaining contenders, and there will be no third candidate to act as a "spoiler," So, the Black Hat, or "spoiler" syndrome is entirely eliminated.
[[Category:Approval voting]]
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