Defeat-dropping Condorcet methods: Difference between revisions
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These are [[Condorcet methods]] which reduce to [[Minimax]] in situations when there are 3 or fewer candidates (except possibly if there are any pairwise ties). Defeat-dropping Condorcet methods that pass [[Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives]] are equivalent to [[Smith//Minimax]] with a [[Smith set]] of 3 or fewer candidates (except possibly if there are pairwise ties). |
These are [[Condorcet methods]] which reduce to [[Minimax]] in situations when there are 3 or fewer candidates (except possibly if there are any pairwise ties). Defeat-dropping Condorcet methods that pass [[Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives]] are equivalent to [[Smith//Minimax]] with a [[Smith set]] of 3 or fewer candidates (except possibly if there are pairwise ties). |
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Many defeat-droppers are [[Smith-efficient]] simply because candidates in the Smith set have no defeats to be dropped against candidates not in the Smith set. |
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Revision as of 08:35, 23 March 2020
The overarching goal of defeat-droppers is to elect a candidate who is "closest" to being a Condorcet winner i.e. to minimize the number of "overruled" voters.
These are Condorcet methods which reduce to Minimax in situations when there are 3 or fewer candidates (except possibly if there are any pairwise ties). Defeat-dropping Condorcet methods that pass Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives are equivalent to Smith//Minimax with a Smith set of 3 or fewer candidates (except possibly if there are pairwise ties).
Many defeat-droppers are Smith-efficient simply because candidates in the Smith set have no defeats to be dropped against candidates not in the Smith set.