Defeat strength: Difference between revisions
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(Moved points pertaining to MMPO to a subindent of MMPO. Though the statements apply to MMPO, the claim that every pairwise opposition method passes LNH and FBC and fail Plurality should be cited or shown.) |
(→Standard: remove example methods—could easily confuse people into thinking Ranked Pairs has to use margins, or Schulze has to use winning votes) |
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=== Standard === |
=== Standard === |
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* '''winning votes (wv)''' = number of votes for W>L if greater than the number of votes for L>W, otherwise zero. |
* '''winning votes (wv)''' = number of votes for W>L if greater than the number of votes for L>W, otherwise zero. |
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** Example method: the [[Schulze method]] is usually taken to use winning votes.{{cn|date=May 2024}} |
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* '''margins''' = (number of votes for W>L) - (number of votes for L>W) |
* '''margins''' = (number of votes for W>L) - (number of votes for L>W) |
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** Gives more strategic incentive than wv but may be easier to understand |
** Gives more strategic incentive than wv but may be easier to understand |
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** Example method: Tideman originally defined [[Ranked Pairs]] as a margins method.<ref name="Tideman2">{{Cite journal |last=Tideman |first=T. N. |date=1987-09-01 |title=Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433944 |journal=Social Choice and Welfare |language=en |volume=4 |issue=3 |pages=185–206 |doi=10.1007/BF00433944 |issn=1432-217X}}</ref> |
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* '''pairwise (non)opposition''': number of votes for W≥L, or equivalently 1 - votes for L > W |
* '''pairwise (non)opposition''': number of votes for W≥L, or equivalently 1 - votes for L > W |
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** Strong intuitive appeal (pick the candidate opposed by the least voters) |
** Strong intuitive appeal (pick the candidate opposed by the least voters) |
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** Example method: [[MMPO]] |
** Example method: [[MMPO]] |
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*** Gives even less strategic incentive than wv (satisfies later-no-help and favorite betrayal). |
*** Gives even less strategic incentive than wv (satisfies later-no-help and favorite betrayal). |
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*** Violates [[plurality criterion]]. A complete unknown can win with no real support, just because everyone forgot to rank them on their ballot. |
*** Violates [[plurality criterion]]. A complete unknown can win with no real support, just because everyone forgot to rank them on their ballot. |
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