Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
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Distributed Score Voting (DSV) is a [[Single Member system|Single-Winner]] and [[Multi-Member System|Multi-Winner]] [[Cardinal voting systems| Cardinal voting system]].
In the [[Single Member system|Single-Winner]] part, it's similar to [[Smith//Score]]. In the [[Multi-Member System|Multi-Winner]] part, [[Distributed Multi-Voting]], the more preferred the winning candidate is in a vote, the more the weight of that vote is decreased in the choice of the next winner.
[[Category:Multi-winner voting methods]]
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All candidates in the vote have 0 points by default.
[[File:DSV procedure
===Counting the votes===
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! rowspan=1 | [[Smith criterion|Smith]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Pareto criterion|Pareto]]
! rowspan=1 | IIA*
! rowspan=1 | [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|IIA]]
! rowspan=1 | [[w:Independence of clones criterion|Clone proof]]
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! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
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<b>IIA*</b>: X is a set containing all the preferred candidates over B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate (in head-to-head) than the candidates in X, then all candidates in X continue to be preferred over B.
This method also passes [[ISDA]].
All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the Smith set.▼
▲All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the [[Smith set]].
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- removing a candidate from the [[Smith set]] is only possible when that candidate lose all the head-to-head with the candidates contained in the [[Smith set]]. This actually becomes a problem only if the excluded candidate is the one who really should have won.
Below is an example in which, through tactical votes, it's possible to bring out a candidate, who should have won, from the Smith set (making him lose).▼
▲Below is an example in which, through tactical votes, it's possible to bring out a candidate, who should have won, from the [[Smith set]] (making him lose).
===Tactical votes===
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* the new winner is actually a better candidate than the previous one (the new winner in the example could also be C).
* the voter has a fairly precise knowledge of the likely ballots result, without which this tactical vote would turn against him.
[[Category:Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]]
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