Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions

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Line 1: Distributed Score Voting (DSV) is a [[Single Member system\|Single-Winner]] and [[Multi-Member System\|Multi-Winner]] [[Cardinal voting systems\| Cardinal voting system]]. In the [[Single Member system\|Single-Winner]] part, ~~this~~it's ~~voting~~similar ~~method consists of the~~to [[Smith//Score ~~voting\|Score Voting~~]] ~~in which all candidates outside the [[Smith set]] are first excluded as winners~~. In the [[Multi-Member System\|Multi-Winner]] part, [[Distributed Multi-Voting]], the more preferred the winning candidate is in a vote, the more the weight of that vote is decreased in the choice of the next winner. [[Category:Multi-winner voting methods]] Line 125: ! rowspan=1 \| [[Smith criterion\|Smith]] ! rowspan=1 \| [[Pareto criterion\|Pareto]] ! rowspan=1 \| IIA* ! rowspan=1 \| [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives\|IIA]] ! rowspan=1 \| [[w:Independence of clones criterion\|Clone proof]] Line 146 ⟶ 147: ! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" \| Yes ! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" \| Yes ! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" \| No ! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" \| Yes ! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" \| Yes Line 155 ⟶ 157: \|} <b>IIA</b>: X is a set containing all the preferred candidates over B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate (in head-to-head) than the candidates in X, then all candidates in X continue to be preferred over B. [[IIA]]: when candidates X and Y aren't part of the [[Smith set]], they are excluded without being evaluated, therefore it's not possible to know which are the group's preference between X and Y. The group's preference between X and Y are evaluated only when they are both in the [[Smith set]] and in this case it can be said that adding an irrelevant candidate doesn't change the group's preference between X and Y . This method also passes [[ISDA]]. All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the [[Smith set]]. Line 178 ⟶ 182: the new winner is actually a better candidate than the previous one (the new winner in the example could also be C). * the voter has a fairly precise knowledge of the likely ballots result, without which this tactical vote would turn against him. [[Category:Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]]