Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
no edit summary
Aldo Tragni (talk | contribs) mNo edit summary |
No edit summary |
||
(5 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown) | |||
Line 1:
Distributed Score Voting (DSV) is a [[Single Member system|Single-Winner]] and [[Multi-Member System|Multi-Winner]] [[Cardinal voting systems| Cardinal voting system]].
In the [[Single Member system|Single-Winner]] part,
[[Category:Multi-winner voting methods]]
Line 126:
! rowspan=1 | [[Pareto criterion|Pareto]]
! rowspan=1 | IIA*
! rowspan=1 | [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|IIA]]
! rowspan=1 | [[w:Independence of clones criterion|Clone proof]]
! rowspan=1 style="border-left:2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotone]]
Line 146 ⟶ 147:
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
Line 155 ⟶ 157:
|}
<b>IIA*</b>: X is a set containing all the preferred candidates over B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate (in head-to-head) than the candidates in X
This method also passes [[ISDA]].
All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the [[Smith set]].
Line 178 ⟶ 182:
* the new winner is actually a better candidate than the previous one (the new winner in the example could also be C).
* the voter has a fairly precise knowledge of the likely ballots result, without which this tactical vote would turn against him.
[[Category:Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]]
|