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Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions

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Distributed Score Voting (view source)

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Distributed Score Voting (DSV) is a [[Single Member system|Single-Winner]] and [[Multi-Member System|Multi-Winner]] [[Cardinal voting systems| Cardinal voting system]].
 
In the [[Single Member system|Single-Winner]] part, it's similar to [[Smith//Score]]. In the [[Multi-Member System|Multi-Winner]] part, [[Distributed Multi-Voting]], the more preferred the winning candidate is in a vote, the more the weight of that vote is decreased in the choice of the next winner.
 
[[Category:Multi-winner voting methods]]
Line 116:
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center"
<!-- criteria headers -->
|- style="font-size:80%; border-bottom: 2px solid #a0a0a0;"
! rowspan=1 |
! rowspan=1 style="border-left: 2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Majority criterion|Majority]]
Line 124:
! rowspan=1 | [[Condorcet loser criterion|Cond. loser]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Smith criterion|Smith]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Pareto criterion|Pareto]]
! rowspan=1 | IIA*
! rowspan=1 | [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|IIA]]
! rowspan=1 | [[w:Independence of clones criterion|Clone proof]]
Line 129 ⟶ 131:
! rowspan=1 | [[Consistency criterion|Consistency]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Participation criterion|Participation]]
! rowspan=1 | [[w:Reversal symmetry|Reversal<br>symmetry]]
! rowspan=1 style="border-left:2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no<br>Help]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no<br>Harm]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Favorite betrayal criterion|Favorite<br>betrayal]]
|- style="font-size:80%;"
Line 136 ⟶ 138:
<!-- Methods -->
|-
! [[Distributed_Score_Voting|DSV<br>single-winner]]
! [[Distributed_Multi-Voting|DMV]]
! style="background: #ffc7c798ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | No*Yes
! style="background: #ffc7c798ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | No*Yes
! style="background: #ffc7c798ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | No*Yes
! style="background: #ffc7c798ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | No*Yes
! style="background: #ffc7c798ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | No*Yes
! style="background: #ffc7c798ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | No*Yes
! style="background: #ffc7c798ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | No*Yes
! style="background: #ffc7c798ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | No*Yes
! style="background: #ffc7c7fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No*
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #ffc7c7; font-weight: inherit;" | No*
! style="background: #ffc7c7; font-weight: inherit;" | No*
! style="background: #ffc7c7; font-weight: inherit;" | No*
|}
 
<b>IIA*</b>: X is a set containing all the preferred candidates over B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate (in head-to-head) than the candidates in X, then all candidates in X continue to be preferred over B.
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center; float: right; margin: 0px 20px 5px 20px;"
|- style="font-size:80%; border-bottom: 2px solid #a0a0a0;"
! rowspan=1 style="border: none; background: white;" |
! A
! B
! C
! D
|-
 
This method also passes [[ISDA]].
|- style="font-size:80%; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | [1] original vote
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 100
| 0
| 0
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; border-bottom: 2px solid #a0a0a0; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | converted vote
| 700
| 0
| 0
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | [2] original vote
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 99
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 1
| 0
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; border-bottom: 2px solid #a0a0a0; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | converted vote
| 697
| 303
| 0
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | [3] original vote
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 96
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 4
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 1
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; border-bottom: 2px solid #a0a0a0; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | converted vote
| 686
| 292
| 122
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | [4] original vote
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 51
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 49
| 0
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; border-bottom: 2px solid #a0a0a0; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | converted vote
| 553
| 447
| 0
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | [5] original vote
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 75
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 20
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 5
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; border-bottom: 2px solid #a0a0a0; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | converted vote
| 627
| 342
| 131
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | [6] original vote
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 35
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 33
| style="font-weight: bold;" | 32
| 0
|-
 
|- style="font-size:80%; border-bottom: 2px solid #a0a0a0; font-weight: inherit; background: white;"
! style="text-align:right;" | converted vote
| 490
| 381
| 229
| 0
|-
|}
 
<b>IIA*</b>: X is a set containing all the preferred candidates over B. If I add C a less appreciated candidate (in head-to-head) than the candidates in X, then all candidates in X continue to be preferred over B.
 
All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the [[Smith set]].
Line 282 ⟶ 182:
* the new winner is actually a better candidate than the previous one (the new winner in the example could also be C).
* the voter has a fairly precise knowledge of the likely ballots result, without which this tactical vote would turn against him.
 
[[Category:Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]]
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