Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
Starting release
Aldo Tragni (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
Aldo Tragni (talk | contribs) (Starting release) |
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Graphically, each candidate is a node; the head-to-head is represented by an arrow, leaving the winning candidate, entering the losing candidate. The tie is represented as a double arrow entering, that is both candidates are considered losers.
2) Find the smallest set X ([[Smith set]]) of nodes that don’t have incoming arrows, coming from outside the set.
Then remove all candidates not in X from the votes.
3) Convert the votes into a range form, assigning 0 points to the candidates with the lowest score and normalizing
M = candidate with the highest score, before normalization.
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By repeating this process several times, you can get as many winners as you like, which will be those removed in point 5.
6) If you want to know the % of victory of the winning candidates then, in each original vote, you must remove all the candidates who haven’t won, and normalize
===Head-to-head===
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Criteria met by DSV:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_clones_criterion Independence of clones criterion]
*
*[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reversal_symmetry Reversal symmetry]
*
Criteria not met by DSV:
*
*
*
*
*
The first two criteria not met are derived mainly from the fact that DSV wants to ensure the victory of the candidate who wins all the head-to-head (when it exists).
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This type of tactical vote works only if:
* there is a
* through the tactical vote, the candidate who should have been the winner can be taken out of the [[Smith set]].
* the new winner is actually a better candidate than the previous one (the new winner in the example could also be C).
* the voter has a fairly precise knowledge of the likely ballots result, without which this tactical vote would turn against him.
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