Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
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Aldo Tragni (talk | contribs) (In the procedure, candidates outside the Smith set are eliminated after the conversion of the vote (point 3).) |
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The complexity in writing the vote adapts to the voter, and it’s also noted that, if 101 or 99 points are mistakenly distributed, the vote will still be valid.
==Criteria==
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center"
<!-- criteria headers -->
|- style="font-size:80%;"
! rowspan=1 |
! rowspan=1 style="border-left: 2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Majority criterion|Majority]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Majority loser criterion|Maj. loser]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Mutual majority criterion|Mutual maj.]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Condorcet loser criterion|Cond. loser]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Smith criterion|Smith]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Pareto criterion|Pareto]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|IIA]]
! rowspan=1 | [[w:Independence of clones criterion|Clone proof]]
! rowspan=1 style="border-left:2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotone]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Consistency criterion|Consistency]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Participation criterion|Participation]]
! rowspan=1 | [[w:Reversal symmetry|Reversal<br>symmetry]]
! rowspan=1 style="border-left:2px solid #a0a0a0;" | [[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no<br>Help]]
! rowspan=1 | [[Favorite betrayal criterion|Favorite<br>betrayal]]
|- style="font-size:80%;"
<!-- Methods -->
|-
! [[Distributed_Score_Voting|DSV<br>single-winner]]
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #98ff98; font-weight: inherit;" | Yes
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
! style="background: #fd8787; font-weight: inherit;" | No
|}
IIA: when candidates X and Y aren't part of the Smith set, they are excluded without being evaluated, therefore it's not possible to know which are the group's preference between X and Y. The group's preference between X and Y are evaluated only when they are both in the Smith set and in this case it can be said that adding an irrelevant candidate doesn't change the group's preference between X and Y .
All the criteria not met are linked to the fact that, through tactical votes, it's possible add / remove a candidate from the Smith set.
- add one more candidate into the Smith set isn't a big problem because that additional candidate must then beat all the other candidates in point 4 of the procedure (and if he manages to beat them all it makes sense that he wins).
- removing a candidate from the Smith set is only possible when that candidate lose all the head-to-head with the candidates contained in the Smith set. This actually becomes a problem only if the excluded candidate is the one who really should have won.
Below is an example in which, through tactical votes, it's possible to bring out a candidate, who should have won, from the Smith set (making him lose).
===Tactical votes===
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