Improved Condorcet Approval: Difference between revisions
Content added Content deleted
imported>KVenzke |
imported>KVenzke |
||
| Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
As a result of this tweaking, ICA does not strictly satisfy the [[Condorcet criterion]]. It is possible that the voted Condorcet winner could lose to another candidate, due to voters tying both candidates at the top, and the Condorcet winner having lower approval. |
As a result of this tweaking, ICA does not strictly satisfy the [[Condorcet criterion]]. It is possible that the voted Condorcet winner could lose to another candidate, due to voters tying both candidates at the top, and the Condorcet winner having lower approval. |
||
When ''q'' is set to 50%, then the method is equivalent to [[Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval]], and all values of t[a,b] (for any candidates ''a'' and ''b'') can be assumed to be zero without affecting the result. |
|||
[[Category:Single-winner voting systems]] |
[[Category:Single-winner voting systems]] |
||