Independence of irrelevant alternatives: Difference between revisions
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* A candidate can enter or drop out of the election without changing the result (unless they win in one of the cases). |
* A candidate can enter or drop out of the election without changing the result (unless they win in one of the cases). |
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The second implication is strongly disputed for voting methods that pass IIA. It requires assuming voters won't change their preferences when the set of alternatives expands or contracts; with something like [[Score voting]], this means no voters can do [[normalization]]. |
The second implication is strongly disputed for voting methods that pass IIA. It requires assuming voters won't change their preferences when the set of alternatives expands or contracts; with something like [[Score voting]], this means no voters can do [[normalization]]. A commonly used example is that if a candidate that a voter finds terrible enters the race, and is likely to win, then the voter has an incentive to do [[Min-max voting]]. Example: <ref>https://www.electionscience.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/image03.jpg</ref> |
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=== Strategic implications === |
=== Strategic implications === |
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